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Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and
the Problem of Administrative Discretion
by
ASHIJTOSH BHAGWAT*
Consider the following examples of regulatory regimes:
In 1976, Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act ("HSR"),1 which fundamentally altered existing
practice regarding the application of antitrust law to corporate
mergers. Interestingly, however, HSR made no changes to the
substantive antitrust rules regarding mergers. 2 Instead, HSR created a
new procedural requirement for major corporate mergers, an agency
preclearance (or more precisely, prenotification) requirement which
firms must comply with prior to consummating a merger. This
seemingly minor procedural change, however, has fundamentally
altered the nature, scope, and content of substantive antitrust merger
law over the past two decades. In particular, commentators and
industry participants have noted that the procedural changes enacted
by the HSR have resulted in an enormous shifting in discretionary
and lawmaking power from the courts to the regulatory agencies who
implement the HSR preclearance regime.
In the United States, both tobacco and alcohol products are
subject to strict labeling requirements. In particular, both types of
products must be sold in packages containing specific health warning
labels, the contents of which are set by federal law. The warning
requirements for the two industries are quite similar, both in terms of
content, and in terms of physical requirements of prominence and so
forth. There is, however, a difference between the two regulatory
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
<bhagwata@uchastings.edu>. B.A. 1986, Yale University; J.D. 1990, The University of
Chicago. I would like to thank Marsha Cohen, Fred Lambert, Reuel Schiller, and Bill
Wang for extremely helpful comments and suggestions, and Matt Borden for excellent
research assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-435,90 Stat. 1390 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976)).
2. The key antitrust provision regulating mergers is section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18, which was enacted in its present form (with minor subsequent amendments)
in the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
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regimes. Tobacco labeling regulations, which are enforced by the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), specify the type and content of
warnings which must appear on cigarette packaging and
advertisements, but no special enforcement procedures are imposed,
so that enforcement is left to agency supervision and prosecution.3 In
contrast, alcohol labeling regulations provide that not only must
alcoholic beverage packaging contain the requisite warnings, but the
labels on which such warnings are printed must be preapproved by

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms in the Department of

the Treasury ("BATF"). 4 Accompanying and associated with this
difference in procedure are very different regulatory cultures. The

FTC is a relatively quiescent agency, with little day-to-day interaction
with the tobacco industry so long as basic labeling rules are followed.
The BATF, in contrast, has ongoing interactions with alcohol
producers through the preclearance requirements, and members of

the industry appear to hold high levels of resentment towards the
perceived arbitrariness and improper uses of power by the BATF.5
In 1990, Congress enacted the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 1990, which provides among other things that statements
regarding health claims may appear on a food label only if they have
been preapproved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). 6
Congress, however, entirely exempted health claims regarding dietary
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
recently sought to exercise regulatory authority over cigarettes as a "medical device"
under 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) (1994), including preclearance authority over cigarette labeling,
in part because of the alleged inadequacy of FTC regulation. See generally Lars Noah &
Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Effort to Regulate Tobacco
Products, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1996). That effort, if successful, will of course
fundamentally change the nature of tobacco regulation. Cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted 119 S.Ct. 1495 (1999)(striking
down FDA regulations of tobacco).
4. See 27 U.S.C. §§ 205(e), 215 (1994); 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.50, 5.55, 7.41 (1998). It should
be noted that unlike tobacco, the BATF's preapproval authority over alcohol labels is not
limited to oversight of health warnings, but also extends to labeling rules regarding the
contents of the beverage, appellation rules for wine, and so forth. These latter rules have
no equivalent in the tobacco context.
5. See, e.g., Consultant Renews Attack on BATF Label Approval Delays, FOOD
LABELING NEWS, (Oct. 26,1995).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) & (r)(6). See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3) (1997 Supp.). The
FDA has a practice of granting blanket authority for specific health claims, so that once
approval is given firms may make that particular claim regarding that food item, and using
the FDA's preferred language, without prior approval. However, if a firm wishes to make
any health claim which has not been already approved by the agency, preclearance is
required (which if successful will typically create a new category of blanket approval).
Prior to 1990, if a firm sought to make health claims regarding food, the FDA then treated
the food as a drug, subjecting it to very strict procedural preapproval requirements and an
onerous substantive standard, as a result of which no such claims were made.
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supplements from this regulatory regime, so that such claims are
subject only to subsequent enforcement actions brought by the FDA.7
The consequence of this regulatory dichotomy is a vastly greater
number of health claims being made with respect to food supplements
than with respect to food, combined with far stronger agency
authority over the food industry, and8 allegedly, greater amounts of
fraud in the food supplement industry.
What do the above examples have in common? In each instance,
a particular substantive regulatory regime has been implemented
through two different procedural modes of enforcement-one of the
modes being a system of ex post enforcement actions brought by
agencies, and the second being a requirement of ex ante preapproval,
or preclearance, by the agency of regulated conduct. In the latter two
examples (cases of tobacco and alcohol labeling laws, and food health
claims and dietary supplement health claims regulation), we see
parallel substantive regimes with different enforcement mechanisms;
while with the antitrust merger laws we see an alteration in
enforcement mechanisms over time, without any change in
substantive rules. What is striking about the examples is that they
reveal that similar substantive regulatory regimes can in practice
operate in entirely different ways when implemented through ex post
versus ex ante enforcement systems. What is affected by the choice of
enforcement mechanism is not only the relative positions and
authority of the agency and regulated entities, but also the actual,
practical scope and substance of the regulatory regime, as well as the
locus of power among agencies, courts, and Congress. In short, the
granting of preclearance authority to an agency can substantially
increase the discretionary power and lawmaking authority of an
agency without any change in the agency's formal jurisdiction or
substantive authority. On the other hand, there also exist some very
strong, practical rationales for granting agencies such authority. This
article seeks to explore the reasons why particular administrative
agencies have been granted different modes of enforcement
authority, and to explore the practical consequences of those choices,
both for regulated entities and for broader regulatory policy.
In presenting the topic of this article, it is useful to begin by
laying out what this article is not about, i.e., the areas which it will not
examine. In discussing modes of administrative enforcement, I will
draw upon examples from the practices of a number of administrative
agencies, including the FTC, FDA, the BATF, the Federal
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D), (r)(6) (1994).
8. See e.g., Gina Kolata, Ideas & Trends: The Unwholesome Tale of the Herb Market,
NEW YORK TIMES, sec. 4, p. 6 (April 21, 1996); Steven Pyat, Melpor Mindranic; FDA
Loosens its Grip on Vitamin Supplement Chains,CHICAGO TRIBUNE, p. 3 (May 17,1995).
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Communications Commission ("FCC"), and the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 9 I do not, however, intend to
examine in any great detail the efficiency or prudence of the
substantive policies pursued by any of these agencies. Also, I do not
intend to enter the law-and-economics debate over the advisability of
regulating primary conduct through a regulatory apparatus versus
regulating end results only.10 Rather, I will assume that a decision has
been made to regulate certain kinds of primary conduct within the
economy and an administrative agency has been created to
implement that regulation. I am also not primarily concerned about
the choice-identified by previous commentators-between public
enforcement of regulatory rules (generally by administrative
agencies) and private enforcement (through lawsuits filed by
individuals)," though I will draw on this commentary and spend some
time discussing the public/private distinction.
Once a decision has been made to regulate conduct, and to
create a regulatory agency with primary responsibility for creating
and enforcing that regulation, however, one must still decide how the
agency should be authorized to enforce the regulatory policies chosen
by the legislature and/or the agency. That question is the primary
topic of this paper. I wish to consider different possible modes of
public enforcement, different ways in which agencies are authorized
to proceed against private citizens. In particular, I identify a basic
dichotomy between ways in which agencies enforce standards: certain
agencies are authorized to engage in prior, ex ante review of regulated
conduct, generally through some sort of licensure or preclearance
system, while other agencies may proceed only through ex post
enforcement, either through civil or criminal prosecution (or its
equivalent), after a regulatory violation has occurred. Of course, this
dichotomy is not a clean one; a variety of enforcement procedures
exist along a spectrum between pure ex post and ex ante enforcement,
and particular agencies may possess a number of different powers
which vary along the spectrum. Nonetheless, I argue that this
distinction is an important one.
The ultimate question I pose in this article is what are the
consequences, for agency power, discretion, and substantive
9. On whether the Antitrust Division can properly be considered a regulatory
agency, see E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An
Enforcement Policy in Transition,64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997 (1986).
10. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 277-90
(1987); Donald Wittman, PriorRegulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between
Input and OutputMonitoring,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1977).
11. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass Sunstein, Public Programsand Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982) (discussing the relationship between a private right to initiate
administrative enforcement, and a private right of action against regulated firms).
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policymaking of the mode of enforcement which an agency is
authorized to implement. I also examine why particular agencies in
particular substantive areas may need one or the other type of
enforcement power. My basic thesis is that granting an agency the
power to engage in ex ante review of private behavior, through
licensure or the equivalent, may sometimes be desirable for practical
reasons, but it should be recognized as having significant, negative
consequences. The power of ex ante review provides an agency with
an enormous amount of substantive discretion to shape the policies it
implements, as well as a great deal of power to coerce or otherwise
hold-up private, regulated entities. Most importantly, ex ante
enforcement often enables agencies to avoid judicial review of their
regulatory decisions by making it impractical or exorbitantly
expensive for regulated firms to challenge those decisions, and so
enhances agency discretion and power in ways both subtle and
unsubtle. In pursuing this analysis, some fundamental points emerge
and will be discussed regarding the nature of administrative
discretion, and why precisely such discretion is of concern to students
of the administrative state. Finally, I will conclude by identifying
various factors which policymakers-primarily the legislatureshould take into account in determining what kinds of enforcement
powers particular agencies should be granted, and by then applying
these factors to evaluate the wisdom and efficiency of some current
regulatory systems.
I. Modes of Regulatory Enforcement
A. ABasicTypology

us begin with a typical regulatory problem. Suppose that
of growing health concerns Congress has made a decision to
the contents of baby food to ensure that all baby food meets
nutritional standards. Once the decision has been made to
regulate, the first step in designing such a regulatory regime is of
course to choose the substantive contents of the regulatory schemethe rules. Let us assume that Congress does so by specifying
particular content and/or nutrients which all baby food must contain;
or alternatively, Congress adopts a broad substantive standard (e.g.,
that all baby food must be "healthy and efficacious"), and delegates
to a federal agency (let us call it the FBFC, the Federal Baby Food
Commission) the power to adopt specific, substantive rules
implementing that standard, which the agency does. All of these
decisions-the decision to regulate, the choice of substantive
standards, and the decision of whether or not to create a new
agency-are likely to be the source of great public debate and
Let
because
regulate
minimal
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attention. Once these basic questions have been answered, however,
a further decision must be made: How to enforce the substantive rules
that have already been chosen? The latter decision-which is one of
enormous practical import-is not likely to command nearly the same
level of attention from the public or from the legislature as the former
decisions. Nonetheless, it is crucial, and raises many difficult
questions.
The first question one might ask is whether enforcement of the
new baby food regulations should be purely private, purely public, or
some combination? One might imagine a regime where FBFC's
authority is limited to adopting substantive rules, but enforcement of
those rules is entrusted to damages actions by consumers of baby
food who have been injured by noncompliant products-actions
which might be brought pursuant to existing tort law, or pursuant to a
newly created, federal cause of action. Congress might also authorize
private injunctive actions in place of, or in addition to, private
damages actions. In today's highly regulated world, regulatory
regimes which are subject to purely private enforcement are almost
unheard of, but they are theoretically possible.' 2 Alternatively to a
purely private enforcement regime, Congress might follow the more
common course of authorizing enforcement actions undertaken by
the administrative agency, here the FBFC. Such public enforcement
can either replace or supplement private enforcement. In a classic
article, Professors Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein have explored
the relationship between public and private enforcement of
administrative regimes, and reached conclusions regarding the best
balance between the two. 13 I will proceed upon the likely assumption
that Congress has chosen to authorize public enforcement of the new
regulations, either exclusively (by preempting existing private causes
of action) or in combination with private remedies.
Once Congress has decided to grant the agency enforcement
authority, the question arises, what kind of authority? Once again, a
basic choice emerges. FBFC might be structured along traditional
lines, and authorized to investigate and prosecute either criminally or
civilly on an expost basis (meaning after a violation has occurred) any
baby food maker who has sold a noncompliant product. In other
words, Congress could adopt a "law enforcement model" for the new

12. The closest examples of such purely private enforcement regimes today are
probably medical malpractice tort claims and regulation of police misconduct. Of course,
both doctors and policemen are also subject to public discipline and enforcement in
principle; but in practice, absent egregious misconduct, such enforcement is notoriously

lax.
13. See generally Steward & Sunstein, supra note 11.
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regulatory regime. 14 On the other hand, FBFC could be structured

along a more "regulatory model," with a greater emphasis on prior
oversight and regulation of private conduct. 15 In particular, FBFC
could be granted preapproval authority in connection with the new
rules, which would require that all baby food makers obtain official
approval, or licensure, from the agency before marketing any
particular type of food. Failure to comply with such preapproval
requirements would of course be subject to punishment (on an ex post
basis), regardless of compliance with the underlying, substantive
standard.
The above discussion identifies two axes along which
enforcement methodology can vary: public versus private and ex ante
versus ex post. These two axes, in combination, produce four
alternative enforcement methodologies which can be depicted
graphically as follows:

Ex Post

Public

Private

Prosecution, either

Private damages actions

civil or criminal

Ex Ante

Preapproval or
preclearance

Private injunctive relief, prior
to illegal conduct (perhaps)

system/licensure

Note that these enforcement regimes are distinct but not
mutually exclusive; a regulatory scheme might contain any
combination of the four choices. Furthermore, the distinction
between ex post and ex ante regimes, as laid out starkly above, is
something of an overstatement; in fact, the distinction is more of a
spectrum so that enforcement regimes can have varying aspects of a
"pure" ex post or a "pure" ex ante system. Nonetheless, the above
typology has value in highlighting the basic choices made by
policymakers while constructing regulatory regimes, and in analyzing
the consequences of those choices. I will therefore proceed to
explicate my basic model by describing in more detail each of the
above enforcement options, with particular emphasis on the public
enforcement alternatives which are the main focus of this paper.
(1) PublicEx Post Enforcement
This is the traditional model for public enforcement of social
rules. Under this model, an enforcing government agency is expected
14. See A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 13
(1995).
15. See id.
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to identify and investigate conduct by regulated parties who have
already violated the substantive rules being enforced, and then to
bring a judicial action to punish that conduct. In other words, it is the
model of the public prosecutor of criminal laws. The model is not
limited to criminal penalties, however, but also covers many other
possible punishments including civil fines or other adverse actions
such as revocation of a license, confiscation of property, loss of
government contracts, and so forth. The critical common factor is
that this mode of enforcement involves the enforcement agency
identifying priorviolations of law, and then obtaining a judicial order
imposing a penalty against the violator.
Examples of ex post public enforcement of regulatory regimes
are of course common. First of all, the entire criminal law is based on
this model. In addition, many regulatory regimes are organized in
this manner. Thus the National Labor Relations Board identifies and
prohibits unfair labor practices by unions and employers and enforces
its prohibitions by seeking a judicial order. 16 Similarly, the FTC
regulates advertising of health claims regarding food as well as
advertising of over-the-counter drugs, using an ex post prosecution
system which includes civil fines and cease-and-desist orders. 17 The
FDA's regulation of prescription drug advertising is also, in principle,18
based on a system of ex post prosecution as mandated by Congress.
The Department of Justice enforces the two primary antitrust
statutes, sections one and two of the Sherman Act, entirely through
ex post criminal and civil prosecutions. 19 Other examples of ex
post enforcement within the regulatory state are myriad and far too
numerous to detail here. As the above list indicates, however, even in
today's highly regulated environment the ex post "law enforcement"
model of regulatory enforcement remains the norm.
(2) PublicEx Ante Enforcement
In the above typology, a pure ex ante enforcement mechanism is
one in which the administrative agency is authorized to review, and
must provide prior approval for, all regulated conduct within a
designated category, regardless of whether the conduct violates any
rule. Concomitantly, in such a regime regulated firms are absolutely
barred from acting within the regulated sphere of activity without first
requesting and obtaining regulatory preapproval, or preclearance.
16. See National Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), (f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1994).
17. See generally Federal Trade Commission Act, §§ 5, 12-15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52-55
(1994); Elisabeth A. Sachs, Health Claims in the Marketplace: The Futureof the FDA and
the FTC's Regulatory Split, 48 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 263 (1993).
18. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1994 Supp.); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (1998).
19. See Sherman Act, §§ 1, 2,4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2,4 (1994).
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The agency's method of enforcement within such a system is of
course to deny approval for conduct, prior to its occurrence, if the
agency determines that the conduct would violate the underlying,
substantive norms. If such disapproval occurs, the regulated firm is
then prohibited from engaging in the conduct unless and until it is
able to invoke judicial review and obtain a court order overturning
the agency's determination that the proposed conduct is illegal.
The critical differences between ex ante enforcement mechanisms
and the traditional, ex post mechanism described above lie in the
timing of judicial review, and in the placement of the burden of
inertia and inaction. Under an ex post system of enforcement the
burden of inertia and inaction operates in favor of the regulated
entity, since absent action by the agency the firm may engage in any
conduct it wishes (always, of course, with the risk that in the future its
conduct will be found to have violated regulatory standards).
Furthermore, the burden of judicialinaction and the timing of judicial
review also favor the firm because a firm is subject to punishment or
coercive measures only after a court has determined that a substantive
violation has occurred. 2° In an ex ante regime, by contrast, all of those
burdens are reversed. Failure to seek or gain agency approval, or
inaction by the agency, preclude the firm from pursuing desired
conduct, and therefore the burden of delay and inaction fall entirely
on the firm. If the agency eventually disapproves the firm's proposed
conduct the firm must seek out judicial review, and once again, the
intervening delay operates to the detriment of the firm, which cannot
engage in desired activities. If agency decision-making and judicial
review were swift and certain in operation, these differences would be
minor; but in the real world, of course, they are not, so the shift in the
burdens of delay and inaction between the two regimes can be very
significant.
Ex ante enforcement regimes within the administrative state are
not quite as common as ex post regimes, but they are far from
20. Many administrative enforcement schemes permit agencies to impose fines or
other coercive measures (such as loss of licensure) upon a regulated entity after a full
agency adjudication, but beforejudicial review is completed. As such, these schemes seem
to bear some aspects of an ex ante system (in terms of the timing of judicial review), even
though in most respects they resemble traditional ex post enforcement by placing the
burden of inertia, investigation, and proof on the agency. In practice, however, such
schemes do not appear to operate very differently from pure ex post enforcement devices,
perhaps because of the generous interim stay provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1994) (authorizing either agency or reviewing court to stay agency
order pending appeal, to preserve status quo), and because agencies do not appear to try
and coerce firms into giving up judicial review rights by imposing punitive sanctions while
an appeal is pending. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, I will presume that such
systems are equivalent to pure ex post enforcement regimes.
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unknown. As noted above, pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act

("HSR"), corporate mergers are effectively subject today to a
preclearance regulatory scheme administered by the antitrust
enforcement authorities, the FTC and the Department of Justice's

Antitrust Division.21

In addition, as also noted above, alcohol

labeling rules are enforced under a preclearance system administered

by the BATF and health claims on food labels must be preapproved
by the FDA.22 Many other examples of preapproval regimes can also
be identified. For example, the staff of the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) reviews all disclosures that an issuer of a new
security intends to make in conjunction with the public sale of those
securities2 All new prescription drugs are subject to preapproval by
the FDA, including both the physical composition of the drugs (i.e.,
the agency must approve the drug's medical effectiveness) and the
labeling accompanying the drug when it is sold 2 4 Any effluent
discharge from a point source into the nation's waterways is subject to
a permitting requirement administered by the Environmental
Protection Agency;25 and under the same statutory scheme, the Army
Corps of Engineers enforces a preclearance regime for the placement
of dredged materials into wetlands. 26 Licensure provisions, such as
the rules requiring all commercial broadcasters to obtain licenses

21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. As discussed in the next section,
describing HSR as an ex ante regulation scheme is a bit of a misstatement, since in
principle HSR requires only predisclosure, not preclearance, of mergers. -In practice,
however, the HSR does in fact operate as a preclearance system, for reasons that will also
be discussed
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. As noted above, FDA preapproval of
health claims is generic, so that once a claim has been authorized it may then be made by
anyone without further preapproval.
23. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994). To be precise, the Act
does not require affirmative preapproval by the SEC, but provides rather that a
registration statement will go into effect after a twenty day waiting period unless the SEC
disapproves it, by issuing a "stop order." See 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1994). Furthermore, in
practice, stop orders are apparently almost never used by the agency; rather the agency's
true power to preclear emerges from the issuer's need for the agency to accelerate the
effective date of a filed registration statement, thus permitting the pricing of offerings to
reflect current market conditions. The agency is able to exercise considerable influence
over the content and timing of public offerings of securities through its power to withhold
acceleration, thereby creating an unwritten preapproval regime over disclosures. See also
Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 687, 690-92
(1997) (discussing first amendment implications of SEC preclearance regulations).
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50,314.100 (1998); Thomas A. Hayes,
Drug Labeling and Promotion: Evolution and Application of Regulatory Policy, 51 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 57,61, nn.43-44 (1996).
25. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
26. See id.at § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.1-320.4, 326.1-326.6,
330.1-330.6 (1998).
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from the FCC,27 operate to enforce qualification rules on an ex ante
basis even though the agency may still enforce other, substantive
restrictions through more traditional ex post prosecution. Finally, in
many regulated industries, before firms can change the prices they
charge for their products they must file a tariff with the responsible
regulatory agency and obtain regulatory approval of the new rate. 8
Preclearance regimes can thus be found in a wide and diverse
range of regulatory programs, administered by a broad array of
agencies. The question that arises naturally is why certain types of
substantive regimes are, or should be, enforced through ex post
mechanisms while others are enforced through preclearance
requirements. Before turning to this question, however, it would be
worthwhile to finish filling out the typology of enforcement
mechanisms, including private enforcement, and intermediate
enforcement mechanisms between pure ex post and ex ante models.
(3) PrivateEx Post Enforcement
Private, ex post enforcement is in some ways the most familiar
and most ubiquitous of enforcement regimes. At its core, it is based
on private parties bringing legal proceedings, typically seeking
damages, against those who have violated regulatory norms and in
the process caused harm to the private plaintiffs. The entire
common-law tort system is one of private ex post enforcement, and
many modem regulatory schemes also incorporate such an
Prominent examples include private
enforcement mechanism.
securities fraud actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;29
private actions to enforce the antitrust laws, including both the
Sherman and Clayton Acts;30 and private discrimination claims
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 31 Such
enforcement regimes have as their hallmark flexibility, decentralized
decision-making, and uneven (sometimes arbitrary) patterns of
enforcement. Furthermore, unlike public enforcement regimes,
private enforcement generally has as its primary purpose
compensation of victims, with only a secondary purpose of preventing
or deterring violations.
27. See Communications Act of 1934, § 301,47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
28. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 203-204 (1994) (tariffing requirements for communications
common carriers).
29. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); see also
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998); Securities Exchange Act, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§78j(b) (1994).
30. Clayton Act, § 4,15 U.S.C. §15.
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, §§ 703, 706, codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3, 2000e-5 (1994); see also St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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In addition to the traditional damages-focused private
enforcement regimes, Sunstein and Stewart have identified an
intermediate form of private enforcement, consisting of a private
right to initiate public enforcement.32 Such an enforcement regime
would also typically be ex post, since it would presumably only be
triggered after the private party suffered damages; and in other
respects it would share many of the characteristics of more traditional
private actions with the great distinction that the compensatory goals
of private damage actions would not be advanced by initiation rights.
In any event, private rights of initiation are beyond the scope of33this
paper, and have been analyzed in detail by Sunstein and Stewart.
In conclusion, private ex post enforcement regimes, like public ex
post enforcement, are common and well-established. Also, like public
ex post enforcement, private enforcement is characterized by a
presumption of legality for regulated conduct, with the burden of
inertia, inaction, and judicial inaction or delay falling on the plaintiffs,
and to the benefit of regulated entities. For the purposes of my
analysis, therefore, we may assume that most of the same arguments
in favor of, and against, ex post public enforcement also apply to the
private variant.
(4) PrivateEx Ante Enforcement
True private ex ante enforcement is almost unknown in our legal
system, since it would require that a private party be authorized to
prevent or coerce the conduct of others, without any prior judicial
intermediary.
Such a "self-help" rule would be extremely
problematic, if not unconstitutional. 34 The closest well-known
equivalent to ex ante relief for private enforcers would appear to be
temporary restraining orders ("TROs"), or preliminary injunctions,
obtained in anticipation of conduct by defendants which it is believed
will violate a regulatory requirement. Such relief is of course widely
authorized and available under both the common law and many
regulatory regimes. 35 There is, however, an important distinction
between injunctive relief of any sort and true ex ante regulation. In
the case of injunctive relief, the burden of inaction and inertia fall
upon the regulator/plaintiff, and are in favor of the regulated. In
other words, injunctive relief does not prevent a regulated firm from
acting until the person seeking to prevent the conduct brings a legal
32. See Stewart & Sunstein, supranote 11, at 1201-12.
33. Id.
34. Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(invalidating a broad congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to private groups).
35. See, e.g., Clayton Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 27 (1994) (authorizing private injunctive
relief against violations of the antitrust laws).
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action, and then the regulated firm is entitled to at least some judicial
review priorto any coercive force being applied against it.36 For these
reasons, for the purposes of my analysis this last category can fairly be
considered to be negligible.
B. Intermediate Modes of Enforcement

The above model of enforcement methodologies sets out two
basic distinctions between enforcement modes for regulatory regimes:
public versus private enforcement, and ex post versus ex ante
enforcement. In fact, however, these distinctions are not as welldefined as the above discussion suggests; instead, each axis is
probably better understood as identifying a spectrum than as
Along the public-private
establishing two distinct categories.
spectrum, for example, we might find many intermediate enforcement
systems such as private rights to initiate public enforcement, Qui Tam
statutes37 , or parens patriae actions by the state on behalf of its
citizens. The ex post-ex ante spectrum is similarly complex-many
modes of public enforcement can be identified which have some of
the characteristics of one type of regime and some of the
characteristics of the other. The goal of this section is to identify and
analyze some of those intermediate modes of enforcement. The
intermediate enforcement systems discussed below are listed in order,
from those sharing more of the characteristics of ex post enforcement
to those which are more akin to ex ante systems.
(1) Shifting Burdens of Proofor Legal Standards

One relatively minor variant on a traditional ex post enforcement
scheme is a regime in which, once a regulatory agency initiates an
enforcement proceeding against a firm, the burden of proof is shifted
against the firm, or alternatively, the legal standard is adjusted to
favor the agency. For example, under the FTC's regulation of
advertising pursuant to the doctrine of advertising substantiation,
once the FTC decides to challenge an advertisement, the burden of
proof is on the advertiser to show that any claims made in the ad were
adequately supported at the time they were made.38 Similarly, the
36. An exception to this general statement is, of course, the TRO, which can create a
temporary judicial order against a defendant prior to its obtaining its day in court. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). However, even a TRO is subject to some prior judicial oversight,
albeit exparte, and furthermore it is of extremely limited scope. See id. As such, it cannot
be considered an important example of private ex ante regulation.
37. Qui Tam statutes permit private citizens to bring suit on behalf of the government,
to recover damages for harm caused to the government, generally with some sort of a
bounty provided to the private plaintiff.

38. See Patricia P. Bailey, How Advertising is Regulated in the United States, 54
ANTITRUST LJ. 531,534 (1985).
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Supreme Court has interpreted section 7 of the Clayton Act (the
primary antimerger provision of the antitrust laws) to create a
presumption of illegality for mergers beyond a certain size as
measured by market share, thereby shifting the burden of proof onto
the merging entities to rebut the presumption of anticompetitive
effects. 39 More generally, any time an administrative agency makes a
finding in an administrative adjudication against an alleged violator, a
defendant who invokes judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") bears a heavy burden in seeking to set aside
that finding; 40 and under the Chevron doctrine, which commands
judicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutes, a
similar shift in favor of the agency occurs with respect to the legal
standard governing any particular alleged violation. 41
Regimes shifting burdens of proof or legal standards are
probably understood, for the purposes of my analysis, as mere
variants of traditional ex post enforcement because in the critical
respects noted above-burden of delay or inertia and timing of
judicial review-such regimes operate in the same way as simple
prosecutions. Along the ex post/ex ante spectrum, therefore, we can
place such systems almost all the way at the ex post end. Of course,
any regime which favors one party to litigation over the other will
change the dynamic between the parties, increasing the bargaining
power of one (here the agency) vis-a-vis the other; but crucially, even
when legal standards and burdens of proof have been shifted,
regulated entities can still claim their day in court prior to being
subjected to coercive state action (except in the rare and
constitutionally problematic instances where judicial review has been
precluded by Congress).
(2) PreliminaryorAccelerated Injunctive Relief

Occasionally, Congress will create an administrative scheme
which permits the responsible agency to seek judicial orders on an
accelerated basis prohibiting conduct which the agency believes will
violate regulatory standards, often in conjunction with special
scheduling requirements imposed on the judiciary. A notable
example was the original version of the HSR, which required
39. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
40. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994);
Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Of course, the APA's burdenshifting provisions apply only on appeal, not to the original adjudication before the
agency, where the agency's prosecutorial arm typically does bear the burden of proof.
41. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
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expedited judicial consideration of motions for preliminary
injunctions against pending mergers brought by the antitrust
agencies. 42 Furthermore, almost any agency with authority to enforce
a statutory scheme can also invoke general preliminary injunction
procedures. Such procedures appear to bear some of the hallmarks of
ex ante regulation, since they permit an agency to regulate and
prevent conduct believed to violate substantive norms before the
conduct occurs. Nonetheless, like shifting burdens of proof, and also
because of the reasons set out above in the discussion of private
injunctive actions, 43 injunctive relief-even accelerated injunctive
relief-is probably best understood as a form of ex post prosecution
because, once again, the burden of inertia remains with the agency in
such situations and judicial review remains available before a firm
becomes subject to any coercive prohibitions.
(3) Voluntary Preclearance

Certain administrative agencies have adopted procedures
(whether because of congressional mandate or, more commonly, their
own initiative) whereby regulated firms are permitted, but not
required, to obtain prior review by the agency of conduct which the
firm is concerned may, in the agency's view, violate regulatory rules.
Such a system in principle has the benefits of granting firms more
certainty and predictability in their actions, and of permitting
agencies to stave off potential violations, without the huge volume
and strongly coercive aspects of mandatory preapproval regimes.
Probably the best known example of a voluntary preclearance regime
is the SEC staff's issuance of "no-action letters" in response to
industry requests that the Commission staff clarify whether they
would recommend enforcement action against particular conduct. 44
In the antitrust area, the primary antitrust enforcement agencies, the
Antitrust Division (of the DOJ) and the FTC, have established
procedures to grant upon request "Business Review letters" through
which the agency may express its view regarding the legality of
proposed behavior. 45 Like SEC no-action letters, business review
letters are not technically binding on the agency,46 but in practice they
provide a very strong assurance against action by the responsible
42. This provision was struck out by Congress in 1984. See 98 Stat. 3335, 3358 (1984);
15 U.S.C. § 18a(f) (1994).
43. See supra Part I.A.4.
44. See I LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 532-36 n.29 (3d
rev. ed. 1998); Donna M. Nagy, JudicialReliance on Regulatory Interpretationsin SEC Noaction Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921,
936-44 (1998).
45. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1998); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (1998).
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1998); 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(9) (1998).
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agencies.47 The BATF maintains a voluntary preclearance system for
alcohol advertising, in parallel with its mandatory preclearance of
alcohol labels.48 Finally, the FDA has enacted a voluntary
preclearance system for direct-to-consumer advertising of
prescription drugs as a means of enforcing its jurisdiction over false or
misleading advertising of such drugs. 49 This procedure is particularly
notable because the FDA is specifically prohibited, by statute, from
adopting a mandatory preclearance system for advertising 0
On their face, voluntary preclearance systems appear to offer
many benefits to regulated entities, without any obvious downside.
Such regimes by definition do not punish firms which fail to seek
preapproval (otherwise the systems would not be voluntary), and they
do not appear to create any additional enforcement authority on the
part of the agency. As such, they appear to be consistent with, and
merely a supplement to, traditional ex post enforcement. Of course, a
voluntary preclearance system might impose a large, even
unmanageable administrative burden on the agency; but that is a
judgment for the agency to make in deciding whether to initiate or
retain such a program.
One caveat is necessary here, however, regarding the actual
"voluntariness" of a preclearance system of this sort. Most voluntary
preclearance systems are truly voluntary in the sense that no
untoward consequences flow from a firm's failure to take advantage
of preclearance procedures. In some instances, however, an agency
may seek to convert a voluntary system into what is in effect a
mandatory one by threatening retaliation (generally implicitly)
against firms which do not obtain preapproval. Such retaliation might
simply be limited to investigation and possible prosecution of the
relevant conduct; but it might also extend to other informal actions,
expressing general hostility to the offending firm. In heavily
regulated industries, where firmlagency interactions are common and
necessary, such threats can have an enormous impact, easily
converting "voluntary" procedures into required ones. There is some
suggestion that the FDA's preclearance system for direct-toconsumer advertisements may operate in this way, though perhaps
due more to caution on the part of firms than agency threats 1 If a
47. See Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. (1972) (statement of Walker B. Comegys);
Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383,1395-97 (1998).
48. See 45 Fed. Reg. 83,530 (1980).
49. See Wayne L. Pines, Some Major Issues in Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising, 49
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 589 (1994); Hayes, supra note 24, at 66-68.
50. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1994).
51. See Pines, supra note 49, at 590; Hayes, supra note 24, at 67; cf. Lars Noah,
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preclearance procedure does operate in this way, then in effect an
agency has managed to create, without congressional authorization,
what is in practice a thorough-going system of ex ante regulation with
all of the consequences that flow from it. Notably, under such a
regime firms cannot in practice act before securing agency
permission; and furthermore, firms in such situations probably face
greater barriers to obtaining judicial review than in formal
preclearance regimes because failure to provide voluntary
preclearance may not qualify as "final agency action" for the
purposes of APA review.52 Voluntary preclearance must therefore be
considered on the borderline between an ex post and an ex ante
system of enforcement.
(4) PredisclosureRequirements
Also on the borderline between ex post and ex ante enforcement
regimes are predisclosure requirements imposed on firms by
regulatory schemes. Such requirements have characteristics of ex ante
enforcement because they require action by the firm, i.e., disclosing
the details of its proposed course of conduct to a regulatory agency,
before it engages in that conduct; but it also has characteristics of ex
post enforcement in that the burden in principle remains on the
agency to bring an enforcement action and invoke judicial procedures
if it wishes to punish the firm or force it to change its conduct.
Examples of predisclosure requirements include SEC filing
requirements regarding tender offers or other corporate control
transactions 3 and the FDA's "premarket notification" process for
medical devices "substantially equivalent" to those in use prior to
1976.54 In addition, many tariff-filing regimes operate in practice as
predisclosure requirements since the governing statutes often permit
tariffs to go into effect after a waiting period without agency
approval, but require a tariff to be filed prior to any change in charges
or terms of service. 55
Like voluntary preapproval, the proper classification of
Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of CongressionalDelegations of Authority,

1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 892-93 (describing the FDA's use of consent decrees to impose
otherwise forbidden advertising preclearance requirements on firms).
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994); Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. S.E.C, 883 F.2d
525, 529-31 (7th Cir. 1989) (no-action letters not reviewable); Nagy, supra note 44, at 945
("the weight of recent authority" suggests that "no-action letters are not 'final orders"');
cf New York City Employee's Retirement Sys. v. S.E.C, 45 F.3d 7,12 (2d Cir. 1995). See
also infra Part II.A (discussing barriers to judicial review under pure ex ante regulation).
53. See HAROLD BLUMENTHAL ET AL., SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 1289-92 (1998
ed.).
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81 - 807.100 (1998).
55. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §203(b) (1994).
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predisclosure procedures depends critically on how the system
operates and is administered by the agency in practice. The HSR
presents an excellent example of this reality. In principle, HSR
created only a predisclosure regime, combined with a waiting period
for consummating covered mergers-the Act requires only that prior
to a merger larger than designated dollar thresholds, the merging
firms must supply certain designated information to the antitrust
authorities regarding the merger and affected markets and then wait
thirty days from the date of notification (or fifteen days in the case of
tender offers) before consummating the merger.5 6 No agency
approval is required. In practice, however, the HSR predisclosure
requirements, combined with other interim coercive powers created
by the Act,57 operate as a preclearance regime. In particular, HSR
explicitly empowers the antitrust agencies to request "additional
information" from merging parties after the preliminary notification
(known in the parlance as a "Second Request"), and to extend the
waiting period for an additional twenty days after compliance with the
additionalrequest.5 8 As other commentators have noted, in practice
this power converts the HSR procedures into a preclearance regime
because it permits the agency to impose potentially fatal delays on
any merger of which it disapproves.59 As noted above, the SEC's
regulation of prospectuses for new issues also operates to some extent
in this manner, converting a waiting period into a full preapproval
regime through the power of delay.6° If a predisclosure regime is
administered in practice as a preapproval requirement, then like a
"voluntary" preapproval regime which is in fact mandatory, such an
enforcement scheme has all of the characteristics of a true ex ante
regulatory system with the added element of greater barriers to
judicial review since, unlike formal disapproval, agency manipulation
of a waiting period is unlikely to be subject to effective judicial
scrutiny.
(5) Interim Coercive Measures

Properly speaking, the enforcement tools described in this
56. 15 U.S.C. § 18A(b), (d) (1994).
57. See infra Part I.B.5.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 18A(e) (1994).
59. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1045; Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of
Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice:A Case Study in the Law of
Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 865, 881-83
(1997); contrast William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement
Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 849-52 (1997) (denying that
HSR creates such undue power on the part of regulatory agencies--author is a senior FTC

official).
60. See supra note 23.
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section are not distinct "modes of enforcement," but rather aspects of
broader enforcement schemes. They include such powers as the
ability to engage in discovery; the ability to temporarily suspend a
tariff or a license pending investigation; or more controversially, the
ability to subject a firm to adverse publicity prior to any adjudication.
What these steps have in common is that in practice, such powers
grant agencies great leverage over regulated firms since the threat of
interim coercion may present a firm with unpalatable options. One
example of such a threat is the Second Request procedure of the
HSR, described above. Other notable examples include the power of
U.S. Department of Agriculture meat inspectors to close down meat
packing lines for violations; 61 the power of agencies such as the
Consumer Product Safety Commission to create adverse publicity
regarding regulated firms;6 2 and the FDA's (admittedly rarely
invoked) power to seize misbranded or adulterated food in interstate
commerce prior to a hearing (a seizure is a civil in rem action brought
by the FDA against the offending merchandise, which may be
brought with or without notice to the owner).63
Many years ago, Kenneth Culp Davis noted the highly
discretionary nature of such powers, as well as their great practical
importance. 64 For the purposes of this paper, the importance of an
agency's ability to undertake such interim coercive measures against a
firm is that they can convert any enforcement regime, including a
pure traditional ex post system, into something more akin to an ex
ante preclearance requirement. As noted above with regard to HSR,
when combined with predisclosure requirements and/or waiting
periods, interim coercive measures become precisely equivalent to a
preclearance regime. Even in other situations, the threat of interim
coercive steps gives agencies great leverage in bargaining with
61. See Robert A. Anthony, "Well, You Want the Permit,Don't You?": Agency Efforts
to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 36 (1992)
(noting enormous coercive effect of this power).
62. The coercive effect of such publicity has been recognized by Congress to be a
sufficiently serious concern that it has placed substantial procedural barriers in the path of
the CPSC releasing such information. See 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (1994); Frances E. Zollers
and David Barry, A Regulation in Search of a Rationale:An EmpiricalStudy of Consumer
Product Safety Act Section 6(b) and its Effect on Information Disclosure Under the
Freedom of InformationAct, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 455 (1991) (criticizing these barriers).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1994); Marie A. Urban, The FDA's Policy on Seizures,
Injunctions, Civil Fines, and Recalls, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 411,411-12 (1992); Richard L.
Waters, The FDA: It's Not Just About Tobacco, 52 J. MO. B. 231, 232 (1996). Such prehearing seizures without notification to the owner have been held to be consistent with the
due process clause. See United States v. An Article of Device "Theramatic," 715 F.2d
1339, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1983).
64. See KENNETH GULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 23 (1969).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

regulated entities, and as a result can, in practice, enable an agency to
constrain a firm to conform to the agency's understanding of statutory
requirements without the option of judicial review. Of course, unlike
with true ex ante regulation, the burden of inertia remains on the
agency since it is only in the face of agency action (i.e., interim
coercive measures or the threat of such) that a firm will be forced to
yield. But such use of interim coercion does share with ex
ante regulation the crucial characteristic, discussed in more detail in
the next part,65 that it permits the agency to impose on firms rules and
obligations of its own creation, shielded from judicial oversight.
(6) Waivers

Many agencies possess legislative authority to grant waivers to
regulated entities from their existing rules. Given their ubiquity, a
brief discussion is necessary of the place of waivers in my typology of
enforcement methods. Most waivers exist as components of other
enforcement systems, both ex post and ex ante, and in principle being
unusual and requiring special-circumstances, they usually have no
effect on the overall structure of the scheme. If, however, an agency
engages in a regular practice of granting waivers based on established
criteria, especially in combination with very strict underlying rules,
such a system of waivers can in effect operate as a means of ex ante
policymaking and regulation.66 This is because if regulations are so
strict that they impede regular conduct, then a waiver operates in
practice as a license for particular preapproved conduct. Such a use
of waivers is presumably unusual, but not unknown, and so must be
considered as one way for an agency to implement ex ante regulation,
even in the face of statutory authorization only to engage in ex post
prosecution.
In conclusion, regulatory enforcement modes come in many
shades and varieties with an almost infinite combination of various
enforcement powers being possible. There are, however, some
important commonalities that emerge when such powers are viewed
through the prism of the typology set forth earlier in this Part. Such
commonalities do not of course capture all relevant aspects of
enforcement powers, but, as the following part discusses in detail, this
perspective has important implications in understanding the shape
and practical operation of administrative schemes.
<
I
_>
ExPost()(2)(3) (4)(5)(6) ExAnte

65. See infra Part II.A.
66. See Martin Shapiro, AdministrativeDiscretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.. 1487,
1504-05 (1983).
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H. Agency Discretion and Agency Power: The Consequences
of Enforcement Methodology
Up to this point, this paper has focused on identifying and
categorizing various methods or procedures through which regulatory
agencies are authorized to enforce the substantive rules which they
administer. The topic of this section is to consider why that choice
might matter. In particular, by looking at some of the practical,
pragmatic consequences of granting agencies particular sorts of
enforcement powers, I hope to identify policy considerations
suggesting why certain kinds of enforcement powers may be
preferable in particular contexts, while other contexts may call for
other powers. As a starting point, however, we must consider why it
matters how an agency enforces its rules.
A. Power, Delay, and Judicial Review

If one begins one's analysis by contrasting pure ex post and pure
ex ante systems of enforcement, basic and obvious distinctions
emerge. Most fundamentally, the difference between an ex post and
an ex ante system of enforcement has to do with who, between the
agency and regulated firms, has residual control and power. In other
words, who is in the driver's seat. As noted previously, in a system of
ex post enforcement regulated firms remain free to act until, and
unless, an agency commences proceedings against it and obtains a
judicial decision supporting the agency's position. 67 In an ex ante
system, by contrast, firms cannot act without agency approval, and if
that approval is not forthcoming the firm must await action unless
and until it obtains a judicial reversal. Ex ante regulation thus shifts
the balance of power between an agency and regulated entities
towards the agency. But why, one might ask, does that matter? After
all, under both systems, firms are entitled to judicial review of adverse
agency decisions, and so under both systems the substantive legal
rules to which a firm is subject should be unchanged. The answer, of
course, lies in the practical consequences of delay and inertia.
The great power conferred upon an agency by ex ante regulation
is the power of delay. In a system where regulated conduct is subject
to preclearance by an agency, the period of time when the agency is
considering an application and, if the agency disapproves, the time
67. Note that in a true ex post system, preliminary agency adjudications do not have a
legal, coercive effect on firms, since a court order is still necessary to enforce the agency
decision. As noted previously, however, supra note 20, some agencies can in principle
impose effective penalties prior to judicial review; but in practice such systems do not
appear to deprive parties of access to judicial review, because of the generous interim stay
provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705.
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spent appealing that decision to the judiciary are equivalent to
waiting periods from the point of view of the firm-meaning that
during this period, the firm cannot engage in the activities it desires.
Furthermore, the power of delay is an extraordinarily potent one. In
part, this is simply because time is money-any significant period of
time during which firms must delay productive activities is a period
when profits are being lost; and when the activity being prevented
constitutes an important component of the firm's business, that delay
can threaten bankruptcy. In that situation, even the threat of delay
from the agency is a devastating one to the firm. As examples,
consider a threat by a BATF official to refuse to approve a new wine
label, thereby indefinitely delaying all sales by a winery;68 or a threat
by a USDA meat inspector to close down a meat packing line. 69 In
both cases, any significant delay spells ruin for the firm. And even if
delay need not mean bankruptcy, any delay in a significant activity
means substantial postponed, or even lost, profits, which given the
time value of money and compound interest can add up to huge sums
as well as a loss of competitive position with respect to other firms.
This point has been made about the HSR merger review process,70
the FDA's drug approval process, 71 and the BATF's approval of
alcohol labels,72 and it applies with equal force to all agency-induced
delays.
Beyond the financial consequences of delay simpliciter,in many
circumstances excess delay can result in a collapse of the plans
underlying the proposed regulated conduct. Once again, merger
review provides an excellent illustration. Many mergers, especially
ones involving publicly traded companies, are often extremely timesensitive since changes in reported profits or stock prices are likely to
unravel any deal over time.73 As a consequence, a regulatory holdup, if sufficiently long, can derail almost any significant merger. New
securities issuances are likely to present similar issues, as is any
activity which is time-dependent.
68. See, e.g., Bronco Wine Co. v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309,
1317 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (describing injury caused by winery when BATF denied plaintiff
label approval).
69. See Anthony, supranote 61, at 36.
70. See Sims & Herman, supra note 59, at 885-86.
71. See Noah, supra note 51, at 878-82 (recounting incidences of FDA delay and their
consequences); see generally Michael P. VanHuysen, Reform of the New Drug Approval
Process, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 477 (1997); C. Frederick Beckner, III, The FDA's War on
Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529 (1993).
72. See Consultant,supra note 5 ("[d]elays in review have resulted in huge financial
losses to processors or importers").
73. See Sims & Herman, supra note 59, at 897 for a discussion of the practical
consequences of delay for merger transactions.
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One very pragmatic, but ultimately crucial, effect of the power of
delay created by ex ante regulation and the impact that delay can have
on regulated firms, relates to the availability of judicial review. As
noted above, in principle ex ante regulation is subject to judicial
review just as ex post regulation is, albeit in the ex ante context review
must occur prior to the firm beginning its proposed conduct. Denial
of a permit, license, or other sort of agency approval would certainly
qualify as "final agency action" for the purposes of review under the
APA.74 In practice, however, judicial review is a slow and uncertain
procedure. Even if successful, the best a firm can generally hope for
is often a remand to the agency to reconsider its decision 75-which of
course translates into more delay. The problem is accentuated by the
fact that judicial review of agency delay as such is difficult to obtain
under prevailing standards.76 As a result, since such long delays are
likely to impose large, ruinous costs on firms, in the face of ex ante
regulation judicial review becomes an impractical option and
therefore a nullity. Moreover, even if in any particular case judicial
review is a practicable option because delay is tolerable, a firm is
often deterred from seeking review because of the fear of agency
retaliation in future proceedings. 77 As a result, both firms and
agencies know that the threat of appeal is a hollow one.
Moreover, there is no other non-judicial recourse in the face of a
recalcitrant agency or an unreasonable agency interpretation of law,
since congressional action is even more slow and uncertain than
judicial action.
It is certainly true that in the modern administrative state
legislative oversight is an important check on agency misbehavior perhaps a more important check than judicial review. At some point,
if an agency develops a reputation for abusive behavior or
overreaching some corrective is likely to occur (as the IRS's current
74. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
75. See e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (holding that a reviewing court
may not base its decision upon grounds not considered by the agency below).
76. See Noah, supra note 51, at 937-38; 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (authorizing judicial review
of agency action "unreasonably delayed"); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr.
v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (leading case establishing deferential test for
review of agency delay); In re Barr Laboratories, Ina, 930 F.2d 72,76 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert
denied 502 U.S. 906 (1991) (denying mandamus to compel FDA to expedite processing of
generic drug approval application); see also Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal
Commission, 953 P.2d 1188 (1998) (delays in the granting of a building permit, even
unreasonable delay, does not constitute a "temporary taking"), cert denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3235 (U.S. Oct. 5,1998)(No. 98-183).
77. For allegations of such retaliatory actions by the FDA, see Noah, supranote 51, at
922-23 & nn.183-186. For similar accusations against the BATF, see Consultant supra
note 5 ("many members of the industry are reluctant to complain due to 'fear of
retribution"').
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woes arguably demonstrate). However, Congress is notorious for its
inaction, and its lack of speed, so that a very great deal of petty,
arbitrary behavior or incremental legal overreaching is possible
before Congress gets involved - as again the example of the IRS
seems to demonstrate. This is especially true if the regulated industry
consists of small firms and lacks political clout. For all of these
reasons, the theoretical availability of congressional oversight is not
likely to be a substitute from the point of view of regulated firms for
judicial review of individual agency behavior.
Basically, ex ante regulation and the power of delay that it
engenders places the forces of inertia, especially judicial and
congressional inertia, at the disposal of the agency. This is a powerful
force since, in many situations, it results in the agency being the final
unreviewable decision-maker on many regulatory issues. This effect
is unquestionably true, though it is hard to prove in the negative since
the denial of judicial review is observable primarily through the lack
of judicial decisions in areas where agencies possess ex ante
preapproval power. Many commentators have noted that the passage
of the HSR, and the coercive Second Requests it authorized, has
eviscerated judicial review of merger policy.78 Other examples are
more difficult to document since they are primarily evidenced by the
absence of judicial decisions, but common sense and casual
empiricism suggest that in the face of ex ante regulation, judicial
review is often utterly impractical from the point of view of regulated
fimS. 79

The combination of the threatened financial injury which ex ante
regulation permits an agency to impose upon a firm, and the loss of
judicial review which it often results in, has very practical
consequences for an agency's relationship with the firms it regulates.
Most obviously, in any situation where the agency and firm are likely
78. See Sims & Herman, supra note 59, at 897-98 & n.96 (citing examples of mergers
failing because of the inability to obtain effective judicial review); William J. Kolasky, Jr.
& James W. Lowe, The Merger Review Process at the Federal Trade Commission:
Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 910-11 (1997);
contrastSullivan, supra note 59, at 1052-53 (denying that HSR acts as a barrier to judicial
review, though conceding that such litigation is rare); U.S. v. Northwest Airlines, No. 9874611 (E.D. Mich.)(action by U.S. D.OJ. challenging reacquisition of Continental Airlines
by Northwest Airlines).
79. For an unusual example of a successful appeal of an attempted BATF revocation
of a preapproved label, see Cabo Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Brady, 821 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Cal.
1992), a case which also nicely illustrates the BAITF's use of preclearance powers to
expand its own substantive authority; see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995); Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). For a more
common example of a failed attempt to obtain judicial review, which ultimately ended in a
settlement, see Bronco Wine Company v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309
(E.D. Cal. 1996) (denying TRO against BATF denial of label preapproval).
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to negotiate or seek settlement, such powers grant the agency a
valuable, often overwhelming chit-the ability to end delay-so that
the balance of power during negotiation shifts decisively towards the
agency. As a result, when the agency and firm are negotiating over
any substantive issue-whether it be the terms of a permit, the
content of a Consent Decree, or more informal agreements regarding
the firm's activities-the agency possesses the ability to impose its will
on the firm in ways which may not be authorized by the governing
statute, may not have been envisioned by the creators of the agency,
and indeed may exceed the agency's formal powers. Lars Noah, in a
recent article, has extensively detailed this sort of agency behavior,
which he labels "administrative arm-twisting. '80 Noah recounts
numerous instances of agencies extracting concessions from firms
which exceed, and may even contradict, statutory grants of power;
and many of his examples stem from regulatory contexts such as HSR
merger review, FERC review of energy mergers, FDA preapproval of
drugs, and FCC broadcast licensing, where the agency possesses ex
ante regulatory authority.8' Other commentators have made the same
point about negotiations to resolve HSR merger investigations-that
the "deals" that emerge from such negotiations are not true
compromises, but rather are more often the result of a firm
concluding that conceding to the agency's demands is the only
realistic option.82 Robert Anthony has made the same point
regarding negotiations between USDA meat inspectors and meat
packing plants;83 and firms appear to have similar4 experiences across
a range of industries subject to ex ante regulation.8
The practical impact of ex ante regulation and its effects on
negotiating power might be illustrated by contrasting two recent
antitrust controversies involving the Microsoft Corporation. In1994,
Microsoft announced its intention to purchase Intuit, the maker of
Quicken, the dominant personal finances software. During the
subsequent HSR investigation, the Department of Justice announced
that it would seek to block the transaction. Ultimately, in the face of
DOJ opposition, Microsoft dropped its acquisition plans.85 Contrast
this with Microsoft's response to the Division's efforts to limit,
80. Noah, supra note 51, at 874.
81. See id.
at 876-95.
82. See Sims & Herman, supra note 59, at 887-88, 896-97; Kolasky & Lowe, supra note
78, at 910-11; cf.Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1051-52 (denying that most HSR settlements are
coercive, because merging parties tend to be wealthy, large corporations).
83. Anthony, supra note 61, at 36.
84. See Cabo, 821 F. Supp. at 604-07 (describing coercive BATF negotiating practices
during label revocation proceedings).
85. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft Scraps a Software Deal that U.S. Opposed, N.Y.

Times, May 21,1995 § 1, at 1.
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pursuant to ex post prosecutions under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
Microsoft's bundling of its Windows operating system with its
internet browser. Microsoft is fighting the Department tooth and nail
on this subject, and has already won an important court victory in the
first phase of the battle. 86 What is striking about these two examples
is that the Antitrust Division's legal position is probably stronger in its
section 2 case than in its challenge to the Intuit merger, where the
anticompetitive consequences were less obvious than what the
Division claims the evidence demonstrates in the internet browser
cases. Nonetheless, the vastly greater agency power generated by ex
ante regulation has produced diametrically opposite results.
As Lars Noah points out, the problem with administrative
negotiations of the sort described above is that they do not occur "in
the shadow of the law."8 7 The lack of effective judicial review, and
the consequent lack of external constraints on the positions that an
agency can take in the course of negotiations means that the results of
such a negotiation are not meaningfully limited. In most settlement
negotiations, no party will yield more than its worst possible outcome
if it chose to litigate. Thus if judicial review were an effective
constraint, no firm would agree to more onerous (or at least
substantially more onerous, taking into account saved litigation costs)
obligations than those imposed by the law. Similarly, no agency
during such negotiations could seek, or would obtain, concessions
beyond what the agency is authorized to impose under law, and
certainly no agency would be able to engage in conduct forbidden by
law. When the shadow of the law is lifted, however, such constraints
vanish, which creates the potential for grave abuses by regulatory
agencies and personnel.
B. Discretion and Supervision
One way of describing the effect of ex ante regulation on an
agency's power is that such regulatory schemes substantially expand
the scope of agency discretion. By granting agencies broad and
unreviewable authority, such enforcement mechanisms greatly
increase an agency's flexibility and latitude. Of course, this is not an
entirely bad thing, since discretion is a necessary and important part
of any administrative scheme, and indeed, without discretion expert
86. See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935,956 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
87. Noah, supra note 51, at 912 (citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ.950, 997 (1979));
Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of
Contract:Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 107 (1995)); cf Harry First,
Is Antitrust "Law"?, 10-FALL ANTITRUST 9, 9 (1995).
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agencies would be largely pointless. Nonetheless, since Kenneth Culp
Davis's pathbreaking study in 1969, 8 the existence and potential
abuse of administrative discretion89has been one of the great concerns
of administrative law scholarship.

Let us begin by considering a most basic question, which is
exactly what we mean by discretion. In an excellent recent article,
Edward Rubin has pointed out that there is a fundamental ambiguity
in the way we understand the concept of "discretion." 9 Ronald
Dworkin's classic study of the problem identified three meanings for
discretion: a decision made subject to standards and review, a
decision made subject to standards with no review, and a decision
subject to no standards at all.91 The first two Dworkin describes as
versions of "weak" discretion, while the last he calls "strong"
discretion.92 Under this model, one might ask what kind of discretion
is produced by ex ante regulation, and whether it is problematic.
However, Rubin demonstrates that at least within the administrative
context, Dworkin's model is both inadequate and misleading. First of
all, no one within the administrative state enjoys true "strong"
discretion, meaning authority subject to no standards, at least not
regarding any important decision. Such a situation would be contrary
to the basic premises of a democratic society, and as such is
unsupportable. 93 Second, even when monitoring, or review, is absent
within an agency structure, this is not typically because the agency
affirmatively desires to create "discretion" in the sense of freedom to
decide on the part of subordinates. Rather, lack of supervision tends
to occur either because of practical constraints, or because the
employee is trusted not to exercise discretion freely-i.e., she is
trusted to act predictably. 94 Once again, therefore, Dworkin's
description of discretion does not capture the reality of the
88. See generally Davis, supra note 64.
89. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Discretionand Its Discontents, 72 CHL-KENT L. REv.
1299 (1997); Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in
Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a
Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship,63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 479, 479-80 (1995)
(describing control of discretion as "the central project" of American administrative law);
Richard M. Thomas, ProsecutorialDiscretionand Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young
and the Aflotoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131 (1992); Martin Shapiro, supra note 66.
90. Rubin, supra note 89.
91. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-32 (1978), cited in Rubin,
supranote 89, at 1301.
92. Rubin points out that in principle, one might have "strong" (Le., standardless)
discretion with review, where the reviewer substitutes her own judgment in reviewing the
original decision. See Rubin, supra note 89, at 1311. In practice, however, such a system
seems absurd, since the first stage of decision becomes meaningless.
93. See id. at 1320.
94. See id. at 1306-07.
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administrative process.
In place of Dworkin's description of discretion, Rubin proposes
two new concepts: supervision and policymaking. 95 As Rubin points
out, both of Dworkin's "weak" modes of discretion in truth refer, at
least within the administrative context, to the presence of supervision
to constrain decisional freedom-review does so for obvious reasons,
while standards present an alternative form of supervision, based on
instructions from a superior to a subordinate rather than oversight of
actual implementation. 96 Strong discretion, on the other hand,
translates in the administrative context into policymaking-the power
to make choices regarding the content of the substantive standards
which will guide the agency's actions21 As noted above, "true" strong
discretion in the sense of standardless power is unknown in the
agency context, but policymaking authority is ubiquitous and
unproblematic-the very reason we create agencies is to permit them
to make policy within their fields of expertise. 98 Such authority is of
course not unlimited, and is subject to supervision through both
substantive standards (generally incorporated in governing statutes or
Executive Orders) and active oversight (presidential, congressional,
and judicial); but it is there, and it is a significant aspect of the
administrative state.
Viewed through the lens of Rubin's analysis, the effects of ex
ante regulation on agency authority begin to be clarified. All of the
practical consequences described above of granting agencies
preapproval authority relate to supervision,to the impact of standards
and external overseers on an agency's freedom to decide. Most
obviously, ex ante reguiation has a tendency to denude judicial
supervision of agencies as a whole, by stripping firms of practical
access to judicial review. In addition, the leverage that ex ante
regulation grants agencies vis-a-vis regulated entities in negotiations
tends in practice to free agencies from the substantive standards
which would otherwise constrain their activities. In his study of
administrative "arm-twisting," Lars Noah cites examples of such
activities, including the FCC's use of licensing powers to control the
content of programming, and the FDA's use of "accelerated" drug
approval to elicit preclearance authority over advertising, both of
which are forbidden by statute. 99 In toto, preclearance authority can
remove most, if not all, effective supervision over an agency's
activities. Policymaking authority, by contrast, exists presumably
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See
See
See
See
See

icL at 1301.
id. at 1303-1314.
id. at 1314-1324.
icL at 1323.
Noah, supra note 51, at 877-82.
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under any enforcement regime and is not directly affected by

enforcement mechanisms in any obvious way (though as we shall see,
it is profoundly affected in nonobvious ways).
Beyond the reduction of supervision over an agency as a whole,
ex ante enforcement mechanisms can also have important effects on
supervision within an agency structure, in particular regarding
supervision over line personnel. The power to impose delay is one
enjoyed not merely by the agency as a whole but also by the line

personnel who are responsible for day-to-day preapproval decisions.
Given this power, firms are often placed in a difficult position when
faced with seemingly unreasonable (or at least not fully authorized)
demands from agency personnel. The option of complaining to
higher-level agency officials generally does, of course, exist, but like
judicial review, it is uncertain in effectiveness and likely to create
further delay. Moreover, such an appeal runs the serious risk of
angering the line personnel involved.'0° Note that unreasonable

demands by agency personnel need not be the result of corruption or
bad intentions, though in some instances lack of effective supervision
can lead to line personnel acting for illegitimate, personal reasons,
and exercising power arbitrarily, or in the extreme case even
corruptly (though actual financial corruption seems to be an
extremely limited problem, at least within the federal bureaucracy). 101
Another preapproval context in which popular wisdom suggests
the existence of widespread, often unreviewed arbitrariness is in the
granting of local zoning and building permits. Once again, the power
of delay, which denial of such permits threatens, allows those in

authority to impose conditions (for reasons sometimes legitimate,
100. Cf Consultant,supra note 5 ('most members of the regulated industry are afraid to
criticize the BATF for fear of retribution. They read stories in the national press about
people who fought with BATF and lost their businesses').
101. I was once recounted a story by an employee of a winery (to remain anonymous)
about a BATF agent who refused to grant approval to the winery's new label (for a new
vintage) because he was offended by a joke on the label. The winery eventually prevailed
on the agent to approve the label, but the story illustrates the arbitrary decisions which
lack of supervision can make possible. Another winery, Wild Horse Winery & Vineyards,
reports that when they sought to name their reserve wine releases "Unbridled Passion,"
the BATF ("who else?") objected, forcing the winery to rename the releases only
"Unbridled." See Wild Horse Winery & Vineyard, Club Sauvage Member Newsletter, p.
1 (October 1998) (on file with author). In both these instances, it is hard to believe that
the BATF personnel who denied approval to the challenged labels were advancing
legitimate regulatory policies. For first-hand, empirical evidence that the BATF is
perceived by the industry to behave arbitrarily, see Consultant,supra note 5 (an industry
focus group revealed that members had "grievances with respect to label review delays,
inconsistencies, employee inaccessibility and rudeness," and the author, an industry
insider, suggests that one cause for the problems in the BATF's preapproval process is
"failure to properly train employees and monitor their performance").
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sometimes not) which might well not survive judicial or higher-level
scrutiny. But whatever the underlying reasons, regulated entities
faced with such1 2demands are often left with little choice but to
"swallow hard."'
The concerns raised by such arbitrary, low-level
decision-making should not be underestimated. Cynthia Farina has
persuasively argued that one of the greatest threats to democratic
legitimacy in the modern state lies precisely in such arbitrariness and
mistreatment of citizens by government officials.1°3 In so far as ex
ante enforcement powers expand the opportunities for such
arbitrariness, this possibility must at least be taken into account in
assessing the social value of such powers.
C. Policymaking and Substantive Standards: "Making Law"

In addition to the problems of generalized arbitrariness and lack
of supervision, the existence of ex ante enforcement authority also
raises substantial issues regarding an agency's substantive powers to
make and interpret law. Here may lie the greatest danger resulting
from the increased discretionary power generated by preclearance
authority. An examination of the effects of enforcement procedures
on the scope of substantive authority tends to show how the line
drawn by Rubin between supervision and policymaking, as well as the
distinction drawn earlier in this paper between procedural and
substantive agency powers, tend to break down in practice.
The basic substantive concern raised by ex ante enforcement
powers and the freedom from supervision which they engender is that
agencies and agency personnel will use the relatively unfettered
authority they enjoy in such regimes in order to coerce compliance
from regulated entities with substantive rules and interpretations
which are of their own creation and are inconsistent with the norms
laid out by the legislature or the courts. In essence, the concern is
that administrators will use their "discretion," their freedom, to make
law. Of course, agencies make law all the time-that is the nature of
delegated rulemaking authority in the administrative state.
Moreover, agencies make law through adjudications and informal
decisions just as they make law through formal rules. 1°4 In principle,
102 See Sims & Herman, supra note 59, at 888-89; see also William Blumenthal,
Ambiguity and Discretion in the New Guidelines:Some Implications for Practitioners,61
ANTrrRUST L.J. 469, 488 (1993) (describing agency practice under HSR procedures, and
noting the limited supervision of lower-level employees available in typical merger
reviews).
103. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed:"Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 1035-36 (1997).
104. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (upholding agency
authority to make rules via adjudication); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 176-81 (1996) (discussing agencies' ability to make rules
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however, all of those instances of lawmaking occur within the
constraining bounds of the scope of the agency's delegated authority.
In other words, the "law" that an agency can make is limited by the
statute which gave it authority as well as by judicial decisions
interpreting the statute, and applying the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of judicial review under the APA.105 However, when an
agency is coercing (or to use a less charged word, negotiating)
compliance in a context where outside supervision is lacking, those
constraints in practice disappear. In that situation, the agency can
effectively "make law" which is distinct from, perhaps stricter than,
and indeed sometimes flatly inconsistent with governing statutory and
judicial standards. If the new "law" that is made merely occupies the
gray zone of interpretive uncertainty, it can perhaps be defended as
merely an instance of an expert agency filling in gaps in a statutory
scheme as it is permitted to do, and to which the Chevron doctrine
When this law goes beyond
mandates judicial deference.
congressional and judicial authorization, 1°6 however, serious problems
of democratic legitimacy are raised. In terms of Rubin's analysis of
discretion, this is the sort of "super strong discretion" which should be
impermissible within the administrative state, since it is in effect
decision-making power which is subject to neither standards nor
review.
Perhaps the best-known instance of an agency making law
through its preclearance powers arises in the context of merger
review pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ("HSR"), and in
particular, in the shape of the various "Merger Guidelines" issued by
the antitrust authorities under the Act. These Guidelines, the most
important of which are the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued
jointly by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the FTC,107 are
officially only statements of the antitrust authorities' "enforcement
policies" regarding horizontal mergers.108 The Guidelines describe
the rules which the agencies will apply in evaluating HSR merger
filings, and so the standards under which the agencies will assess the
legality of proposed mergers. In practice, however, the 1992
Guidelines constitute what is in effect the "law" of horizontal merger
since they state rules which for all practical purposes must be
through enforcement policies).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
106. Note that the Chevron doctrine does not compel deference to agency
interpretations inconsistent with prior judicial ones. See Lechemere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502
U.S. 527,536-37 (1992).
107. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
13,104 ("1992
Guidelines (April 2, 1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
Guidelines").
108. See id.
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complied with by merging firms for reasons stated previously.
Indeed, in the past decade the 1992 Guidelines have become the
dominant tool through which horizontal merger law is applied by
practitioners and increasingly taught in law schools. Admittedly, this
is not necessarily a bad thing-the 1992 Guidelines are almost
certainly a superior body of rules to the confusing and inconsistent
case law which they have effectively displaced-nor are the
Guidelines necessarily in conflict with current judicial attitudes (and
likely interpretations). The 1992 Guidelines are, however, "law"
which lack any legislative, democratic pedigree, and which have been
passed without the procedural protections and judicial supervision of
the APA.
The merger guidelines, moreover, are not the only instance of
the antitrust authorities "making law" pursuant to the HSR process.
Since 1982, the Antitrust Division has adopted a policy towards
proposed mergers called "fix-it-first" (the FTC had already been
following a similar policy for many years). Under this policy, if,
during the HSR review process the Division concludes that a merger
poses anticompetitive problems, it will seek to "fix" the problem by
negotiating a consent decree with the merging parties, the terms of
which should address the Division's concerns, rather than to simply
challenge the merger in court. The decree might require the firms to
divest parts of their business, to create barriers between different
divisions, or might impose even more detailed regulatory obligations
on the merged firm, such as a duty to deal with competitors. 1°9 Like
the 1992 Guidelines, in principle the consent decrees are is not a bad
thing-after all, generally negotiation and settlement are superior to
litigation as a means of dispute resolution. The problem is that these
consent decrees are often not negotiated "in the shadow of the law."
As a consequence, the agencies will sometimes extract consent
decrees even when there is probably no violation of the statute under
judicial interpretations"0 and the consent decrees often impose
remedies which are broader and more intrusive than anything the
agencies would have been likely to obtain in litigation."' As an
example, one commentator has noted with disapproval the Clinton
Administration's policy of carefully scrutinizing vertical mergers or
relying on "the latest incantations of economic game theory" in its
decisions to challenge mergers, neither of which positions are likely to

109. For good descriptions of the Fix-it-First policy, see Kolasky & Lowe, supra note
78, at 901-03, and Sullivan, supranote 9, at 1034-42.
110. See Melamed, supra note 10, at 13-14.
111. See id. at 14; Kolasky & Lowe, supra note 78, at 893; Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust
and the Rise of the Regulatory ConsentDecree, 10-FALL ANTrrRUST 4 (1995).
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gain great judicial support." 2 From the point of view of merging
firms and antitrust attorneys, these consent decrees together
constitute a new "law" of antitrust distinct from and in addition to the
"law" of the merger guidelines. This law sets out substantive rules
and theories with which parties, in practice, must comply, and lays out
remedial obligations which firms must follow.
Not only have the antitrust agencies been effectively "making
law" pursuant to their pre-review powers under HSR, but since the
passage of HSR in 1976 the various Guidelines and other agency
internal policies have become essentially the only law governing such
mergers because of the absence of any judicial (or congressional)
activity in this area. It has been widely noted that one of the most
stunning and apparently unexpected effects of the passage of HSR
was the virtual elimination of antitrust merger litigation in the
courts.1 13 The Supreme Court has not decided any substantive
merger cases since 1974,114 and one commentator reports that in the
ten years prior to 1997, there were only ten substantive appellate
decisions on mergers-half of which involved hospitals. 115 This
paucity of litigation is not particularly surprising given the barriers to
judicial relief in the HSR process noted above (an alternative source
of merger litigation might have been private antitrust actions against
mergers, but the Supreme Court has over the same period of time
created substantial, often insurmountable barriers to such litigation in
the form of the "antitrust injury" and "antitrust standing"
doctrines 6). The consequences of this, however, is that given a body
of Supreme Court precedent that is a quarter-century, and several
economic theories, out of date, and given the lack of other case law,
the antitrust agencies' "enforcement policies" are in effect the law of
antitrust mergers today. What is troubling about this situation is that,
as noted earlier, the law created by the agencies diverges from, and in
112. Sims & Herman, supra note 59, at 899-900.
113. See Sims & Herman, supra note 59, at 865-66; Malcolm R. Pfunder, Some
Reflections on, and Modest Proposalsfor Reform of, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger
Notification Program,65 Antitrust LJ. 905, 907-08 (1997); Kolasky & Lowe, supra note
78, at 890-91; Melamed, supra note 10, at 14.
114. See generally United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Connecticut
National Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
115. See Sims & Herman, supranote 59, at 881 & n.57.
116. See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Cargill
v. Montfort, 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Associated General Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). Perhaps not surprisingly, the Antitrust
Division has supported and encouraged this development, thereby defending its own
position as the primary creator of merger law. See Thomas Kauper, The Justice
Departmentand the AntitrustLaws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?,35 ANTITRUST BULL. 82,
111-13 (1990).
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many respects exceeds what the antitrust statutes, as they would likely
be interpreted by today's judiciary, require of firms. The "law" of
mergers is thus no longer the Sherman Act, no longer the Clayton
Act, and no longer judicial decisions. Instead, it is the current
enforcement policies of the Antitrust Division
and the FTC, largely
117
unconstrained by outside review or standards.
The above discussion of lawmaking in the shadow of the HSR
review process provides an example of agencies who possess
congressional authority to interpret and enforce particular statutes
utilizing their preclearance powers to extend their lawmaking power,
perhaps beyond statutorily permitted limits. The problem of
"unauthorized lawmaking" in the context of preclearance authority is
not, however, limited to agencies as a whole exceeding their statutory
confines. As noted above, preapproval enforcement powers can have
the consequence of weakening supervisory structures within an
agency, just as they can weaken external supervision of an agency. If
a lower level employee who possesses line authority to grant or deny
a preapproval request chooses to impose his or her own rules or
interpretations upon a regulated entity, often those rules can, in
practice, have a binding effect no different from duly enacted
regulations or statutes. Internal agency review procedures may be too
slow or inadequate to provide sufficient protection to firms which are
unhappy or disagree with the employee's demands, and so the firm is
faced with the unpalatable choice of accepting the huge costs imposed
by delay, or yielding to the employee's demands." 8 These demands
might simply constitute the employee's own honest (albeit perhaps
mistaken or even unreasonable) interpretation of existing statutes
and regulations, or they might go well beyond any conceivable
117. Admittedly, the problem of agency enforcement policies becoming an effective
source of "law" is not unique to mandatory preclearance schemes. Many commentators
have noted that the SEC's voluntary "no-action" letter preclearance mechanism has
become the source of an enormous body of effectively binding securities regulation, both
because of the in terrorem effect of a potential agency enforcement action, and because
courts often defer to SEC interpretations stated in no-action letters during litigation. See
Nagy, supra note 44, at 924-26. Indeed, it has been suggested that in recent years the SEC
has actively sought to employ the no-action procedures to make substantive policy while
evading judicial review and the APA's procedural requirements. See id. at 949-53. In so
far as the SEC is able to make "law" through this mechanism, however, what this suggests
is that in some respects the SEC's "no-action" procedures may not be voluntary from the
practical perspective of industry participants, and is in effect an ex ante enforcement
system, though this is probably due more to industry caution than agency coercion.
118. The problem of constraining lower-level employees from abusing their discretion
is of course not limited to ex ante enforcement regimes. The example of police officers'

power to stop or arrest motorists demonstrates that the problem is universal. Nonetheless,
the discussion in the text shows that the problem is likely to be worse within an ex ante
rather than an ex post enforcement system, all other things being equal.
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enacted authority. In this context, however, even the whims of
agency personnel constitute "law" in a meaningful sense because they
are backed up by the coercive power of the state (i.e., by rules
prohibiting firms from acting without preapproval or a license)-a
coercive power which in a society ruled by law is and should be of the
greatest concern.
One further point should be noted regarding the lawmaking
power of agencies that possess preapproval authority. Until now, the
above discussion has focused on an agency's use of its discretion to
extend the law beyond authorized limits. In principle, however, an
agency might also use such freedom to restrict the law by failing to
enforce it as strictly as intended by Congress or the courts. The
Reagan Administration, for example, was accused of adopting such a
policy towards mergers in the 1980s. There is a significant potential
limitation on such power, however, in the form of private rights of
action, which can produce adjudicated challenges to private conduct
even in the face of agency inaction." 9 Such private challenges are of
course a direct threat to an agency's power to effectively limit or
repeal regulatory standards-which perhaps explains why the
Antitrust Division during the Reagan Administration actively
opposed private rights of action under the antitrust laws, regularly
urging the Supreme Court to limit their application. 120 The bottom
line, however, is that underenforcement is not a particular vice of
preapproval authority since, even in an ex post enforcement regime,
an agency can simply choose not to bring prosecutions.
Ultimately, reasonable people may differ over the wisdom of
granting agencies the sort of expanded, unchecked lawmaking
authority that often comes with preapproval enforcement powers.
Some might applaud the greater shift of power to expert executivebranch agencies from Congress and the courts, neither of whom
possess much expertise over the technical areas which tend to be the
domains of agency regulation. This same school of thought might
generally also support the greater administrative discretion-meaning
by preapproval
of agencies-created
reduced supervision
enforcement authority. In this respect, one's views are likely to
depend on one's opinion of the value of "expertise," as well as the
relative merits of the policymaking potential of the different branches
of government. Even if broader agency authority is desirable,
however, presumably all would agree that such power must be
exercised within the constraints imposed by Congress, and that when
agencies are dealing with individual citizens some judicial supervision
119. See Bhagwat, supra note 104, at 177-78 (discussing the relationship between agency
enforcement discretion and private rights of action).
120. See Part I.B.5, supra;Kauper, supra note 116, at 111-13 (1990).
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is essential.
Protecting citizens from arbitrary exercises of
governmental power is, after all, the overarching purpose of judicial
review in the administrative area and of the judicial power generally,
in part because of the perception that political constraints on agencies
are unlikely to provide sufficient protection for individuals. The
difficulty with ex ante enforcement powers is that they enable an
agency to evade even the minimal constraints and supervision
provided by statutory restrictions and judicial oversight.
D. Efficiency, Deterrence, and Protecting Society. Benefits of Ex Ante
Authority

The above discussion has primarily emphasized the concerns and
drawbacks of granting an agency ex ante enforcement authority. Such
authority, however, also has some important advantages which should
not be ignored because in the final analysis, the benefits and demerits
of ex ante authority must be balanced in deciding whether such
authority should be granted in any particular circumstance.
Perhaps the most important benefit of preapproval authority
involves an agency's ability to impose remedies and avert harm. This
is because ex ante enforcement occurs before the challenged conduct
has been undertaken, and so averts violations before they occur. This
has two advantages. First, there are certain kinds of violations which
are likely to create irreparable harms, which society may consider
unacceptable (note that irreparable and unacceptable are not
synonymous-it may be considered necessary to tolerate certain
irreparable harms in the name of efficiency). Ex ante enforcement
permits an agency to prevent such harms from occurring in a way that
ex post enforcement cannot since the latter is not triggered until the
violation and harm have already occurred. The leading example of
this kind of benefit is certainly the FDA's preapproval authority over
prescription drugs and food additives. In this regulatory regime, the
averted harm from a violation-serious injury or death to a
substantial population of citizens-is considered sufficiently
irreparable and significant that the added costs of preapproval, in
terms of delay and loss of supervision over agencies, are probably
worthwhile. The USDA inspection regime for meatpacking plants
described above 121 probably also falls within this category, as do a vast
array of local building permitting and health licensing regimes.
In addition to averting irreparable harm, a preapproval regime
greatly enhances an agency's ability to impose effective remedies
against prohibited conduct. The concern here is that when agencies
are limited to ex post enforcement actions, the remedial options
121. See supra Part I.B.5.
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available at the end of such an action are often quite limited. Fines or
even criminal penalties are of course always an alternative, but fines
do not undo the harm (past and continuing) caused by a violation;
and criminal penalties, in addition to not undoing harm, are unlikely
to be imposed in a wholesale manner, especially in the absence of
mens rea. Equitable or behavioral remedies, on the other hand, can
be very difficult to impose when a violation is long past and its
consequences are largely a fait accompli. Such concerns were in fact a
major (probably the primary) motivation behind the adoption of
HSR pre-review of mergers. Before HSR, the antitrust authorities
often discovered that by the time they had successfully concluded a
lengthy merger prosecution, the two companies were so intertwined
122
that true divestiture, to restore the status quo ante, was impossible.
HSR prereview permits the agencies to formulate and impose a
remedy before the merger has occurred, and thus before such barriers
arise-a benefit which is reflected in the Antitrust Division's strong
promotion of its "fix-it-first" policy. 123 Similar policies also probably
support building permitting requirements, where regulatory officials
must approve plans prior to construction-in such circumstances, the
costs of curing violations ex post by requiring the building to be torn
down and rebuilt are so exorbitant that such a remedy is unrealistic
and unlikely to be imposed.
Another obvious benefit of preapproval authority is that it
severely reduces the investigatory burden on agencies in enforcing
the rules they are charged with administering. The problem with ex
post prosecution schemes is that they place the burden of finding,
investigating, and prosecuting violations solely on the agency. The
agency must discover the violation, accumulate the evidence needed
to prove it, and then engage in protracted expensive litigation before
obtaining any relief. When violations are difficult to ferret out, the
burdens imposed by such a scheme can be overpowering, leading to
systematic underenforcement and thus a failure to avert the social
harms which the regulatory regime is designed to prevent. Such
problems are likely to be particularly severe when the underlying
conduct or violations are not visible or are very numerous. Ex ante
regulation, by contrast, places most of the burden of compliance on
firms by requiring them to disclose every potential violation to the
agency, and to provide the agency with sufficient information so that
a determination can be made whether a violation exists or not. In
effect, the firm builds the case against itself before the agency. Of
course, to be effective, such a scheme must be reinforced with
122. See Baer, supra note 59, at 830-31 (recounting remedial difficulties faced by the

antitrust authorities before HSR).
123. See Sullivan, supranote 9, at 1034-40.
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penalties and prosecution if a firm fails to obtain the required
preapproval before acting; but enforcing such penalties is likely to be
less burdensome on the agency since a violation is typically easier to
identify and prove. 124 Relieving investigatory burden appears to have
been one of the motivations for adopting the HSR prereview
process,'25 as it probably was for the BATF's preapproval authority
over alcohol labels. The only caveat one might raise regarding the
benefit of reduced investigatory burdens and benefits is whether a
simple (and true) predisclosureregime might not provide many of the
same benefits to the agency, without the potential for delay and
unchecked power, which true preapproval authority threatens to
126
create.
Finally, it is important to note that preapproval authority may
also have some advantages for regulated firms, not just for agencies.
Most importantly, ex ante enforcement regimes permit firms to obtain
information about an agency's enforcement goals, policies, and
priorities before the firm has engaged in potentially illegal conduct,
which enables the firm to avoid a violation. It is important to
remember that ex post prosecutions are expensive and sometimes
embarrassing (especially in certain consumer industries such as food
or drugs), so that most firms would rather avoid them if possible, even
if it means greater up-front costs. Ex ante regimes permit firms to
clarify their legal positions and avoid inadvertent violations before
they act. As with alleviating investigatory burdens, however it may
be that many of the informational benefits of ex ante enforcement
might be achievable through less intrusive means than full
preapproval authority. In particular, most of the benefits to firms
might be achieved if agencies established voluntary preclearance
programs, or if agencies clearly disclosed their enforcement policies
through prior publication, and then adhered to those policies. 127
Therefore, informational benefits to firms are not in themselves likely
to be a sufficient justification for adoption of an ex ante enforcement
124. See William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 Antitrust L.J. 825, 828-29 (1997). One exception to this
statement might be the FDA's broad, complex enforcement policy regarding "off-label"
use, which is simply an enforcement mechanism for its drug preapproval authority. See
generally James M. Beck and Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed
Consent:Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71 (1998).
125. See Baer, supranote 59, at 828-29.
126. As the discussion above, supra Part I.B.4, supra, suggests, there is admittedly a
difficult line to draw here, since to be effective a predisclosure regime must require
detailed, timely disclosure, reinforced by the threat of sanctions for noncompliance; but as
in the case of HSR, such a strict predisclosure regime has a tendency to mutate in practice
into a preapproval regime.
127. See Bhagwat, supra note 104, at 183-84 (proposing a regime under which agencies
are required to publish their enforcement policies).
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regime.128
E. Summary: Policy Considerations Surrounding the Ex Post/Ex Ante
Choice

The above discussion examines in some detail the relative merits
and demerits of different modes of administrative enforcement. In
this section, I will seek to summarize the most important aspects of
that analysis and supplement it somewhat by highlighting particular
factors which policymakers would wish to take into account in
determining whether a particular regulatory regime would be best
enforced through ex post prosecutions or through a system of ex ante
agency approval.
(1) Likelihood and Willfulness of Violations

One of the most obvious factors that should be considered in
evaluating the optimum enforcement regime is the frequency and
likelihood that regulated firms will violate the rules of the regulatory
regime, as well as the nature and willfulness of anticipated violations.
As the incidence of violations becomes higher, investigatory burdens
on the agency multiply sharply, suggesting the need for ex ante review
and preapproval to reduce that burden. Concomitantly, as violations
become less frequent ex ante enforcement becomes less necessary,
since ex post prosecution becomes a more feasible and effective
129
means of punishing violations and deterring future misbehavior.
Also of concern is the incidence rate of violations, meaning the
number of violations as a fraction of the underlying regulated activity
(as opposed to the sheer number of violations). As the incidence of
violations rises, the costs of ex ante enforcement in terms of "false
positives," meaning unnecessary prereview and delay of firm
activities, declines and thus the case for ex ante regulation becomes
stronger. Finally, note that the willfulness of violations is also
relevant to the analysis. If firms intentionally evade or violate the
regulatory regime on a frequent basis, the case for ex ante
enforcement becomes a powerful one since in such a situation the
costs of investigation and detection associated with ex post
128. Another potential benefit to firms of preapproval authority is a possible defense to
tort actions. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory

Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REv. 1210 (1996). This benefit, however, could also be
made available through voluntary preclearance, though it generally is not.
129. One potential complication here is that the nature of the enforcement regime and
the incidence of violations may not be independent - i.e., the adoption of an ex post
enforcement system may lead to an increase in violations by firms. If, in a regulatory
system, such an effect is observed, and it is significant, that is of course an independent
argument in favor of ex ante enforcement. I am grateful to Reuel Schiller for this insight.
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prosecution are likely to be very high.
The only caveat one might raise regarding the above analysis
concerns whether some intermediate solution less burdensome than
full ex ante enforcement might be considered to address these
concerns. In particular, predisclosure requirements might provide a
reasonable alternative by reducing the investigatory burden on the
agency without creating the broad discretionary authority that
characterizes preapproval regimes. Furthermore, shifting burdens of
proof against regulated firms may reduce the agency's litigation
expenses. However, predisclosure alone is not a panacea since under
such regimes the costs and burdens of litigation remain on the agency,
and so when violations are common underenforcement remains a
problem. Also, shifting the burden of proof does little to alleviate the
agency's investigatory burden since it retains the responsibility for
identifying potential violations and proving a prima facie case. All of
which suggests that in the face of a high incidence of violations ex ante
regulation is indeed an appropriate response.
(2) Ease of Detection

Closely related to the above considerations is another factor
obviously relevant to the choice of an enforcement scheme: the ease
with which the agency is likely to be able to detect a violation of the
regulatory regime, and to determine the identity of the violator. Both
of these things are likely to depend on the nature of the regulated
activity. Certain kinds of regulatory violations are very public, or
cause obvious and prominent injury. 130 Therefore, these violations
are easily detected, and the nature of the violation makes the identity
of the violator easy to determine. As an example, consider modern
health warning requirements for alcohol and tobacco products.
Identifying a violation of a labeling requirement is relatively easy
since these products are publicly sold, making reporting of a violation
quite likely. Identifying the violator is of course trivial. In those
circumstances, ex post prosecution is likely to be an effective form of
enforcement since few violations are likely to escape the attention of
the agency and the investigatory burden on the agency is limited. On
the other hand, certain types of violations are extremely hard to
detect, or even if detected, hard to attribute to a particular
perpetrator. Examples might include anticompetitive mergers, where
the anticompetitive effects of a merger in terms of higher prices or
excluded competitors often appear years after the merger, and are
difficult to trace to a particular cause such as the merger; or polution,
130. Unfortunately, visible, public injuries also tend to be serious and irreparable,
which, as the next section indicates, is an independent, strong rationale for ex ante
regulation. Consider as an example a nuclear accident.
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which may be easily detectable, but is often difficult to attribute to a
particular polluter. Under those circumstances, ex post regulation
might be ineffective due to the massive investigatory burdens on the
agency, and so ex ante enforcement authority may be called for.
(3) IrreparableHarm and Remedial Concerns

As the examples of FDA drug approval and HSR merger review
indicate, one of the most powerful justifications for granting an
agency preapproval authority is the impossibility of effectively
remedying illegal actions through expost prosecutions. Most notably,
when a violation is likely to cause injury which is both irreparable and
of such a serious nature that as a matter of social policy it is
considered intolerable, a strong case can be made for ex ante
enforcement authority. On the other hand, if the injury is correctable
after a prosecution through either financial reparations or curative
action, or if the injury is not a very serious one even if effectively
irreparable, the case for ex ante regulation becomes much weaker. In
evaluating the feasibility of repairing or remedying a harm ex post, it
should be noted that the barriers to such a remedy might be inherent,
as in the case of death or serious injury to humans; or they might be
practical, as in the difficulty of divesting firms many years after a
merger, of imposing any effective penalty against a violator who is
judgment and punishment proof, or more generally of requiring
exorbitantly expensive curative measures when the violation does not
threaten immediate injury.
An alternative, but probably less effective, enforcement strategy
in the face of remedial concerns might be to grant agencies a
combination of a right to predisclosure and an enhanced ability to
obtain preliminary injunctive relief from the judiciary (this was in fact
the originally intended model for HSR). The benefits of such a
regime are that it does interpose judicial review before the agency can
coerce citizens, but at the same time it permits enforcement before
the harm occurs. In practice, however, especially in the modern era
of crowded dockets, obtaining accelerated judicial relief is often very
difficult, and can be quite expensive both to society and to the agency
in terms of litigation expenses, which suggests that ex ante
enforcement may indeed be the best response to serious remedial
problems.
(4) Costs of Delay

If the regulated activity is of such a nature that delay is likely to
be extremely costly to the regulated entity and/or to society at large,
this is a strong consideration against granting an agency ex ante
enforcement authority. The reasons for this are two-fold. First of all,
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ex ante enforcement by its nature imposes delay since prereview and
approval takes time, and during that time activity must be suspended.
This delay is in itself costly to society since the economic (or other)
benefits of the regulated activity are foregone or deferred. In
addition, the costliness of delay is the primary factor which permits
agencies which enjoy preapproval authority to enlarge their
discretionary authority, evade supervision, and ultimately expand
their effective lawmaking power. Thus the downside risks of ex ante
enforcement powers are much less likely to materialize in contexts
where regulated firms do not face great time pressure and so are able
to appeal unfavorable decisions or unreasonable demands without
suffering undue loss.
If delay is very costly but an ex ante regime seems attractive for
other reasons, some alleviative steps might be effective to at least
limit the above problems. Most notably, it may be advisable to
provide firms access to accelerated judicial review procedures (in so
far as this is practical) in the event of agency delay or denial of
permission so that the coercive impact of delay is at least limited.
Another more controversial possibility is to require an agency to
compensate the firm for the costs of delay in the event of successful
appeal of an agency decision-though the political and practical
barriers to such a solution are substantial.' 3 '
(5) Nature of Regulated Activity ("PreferredInterests")

One major consequence of ex ante enforcement authority is that
it tends to weaken the constraining influence of judicial review, and
concomitantly, to create wider discretionary authority in agency
personnel. Such unconstrained authority should be of concern in all
circumstances, but those concerns become especially heightened
when the activity being regulated involves interests which are
considered by society to deserve special respect and protection. The
threat to liberty posed by unconstrained regulation of such activity is
far more serious because of the danger that agencies will use their
unsupervised power to impose arbitrary restrictions on individual
freedoms. This of course suggests that preapproval authority in such
circumstances is inappropriate.
The best example of a "preferred interest" raising precisely such
concerns is speech. It has long been recognized that the Constitution
131. Cf. Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1197 (mere delay in the granting of a building permit,
even unreasonable delay, does not constitute a "temporary taking" requiring
compensation); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCIENCE 22 (1971) (noting the incentives faced by administrative agencies to pursue
distributional goals by imposing regulatory costs on firms rather than through public
funding).
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strongly disfavors governmentally imposed "prior restraints" on
speech or the press; 132 and ex ante regulation would certainly qualify
as such a prior restraint when the regulated activity is speech.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that unfettered or
standardless discretion in the granting of licenses for speech activities,
another common characteristic of preapproval regimes, is also
constitutionally suspect. 133

Nonetheless, ex ante regulations of

speech-for example, the BATF's preapproval of alcohol labels or
the SEC's preapproval of securities prospectuses-have not generally
been treated as unconstitutional prior restraints or otherwise
constitutionally troublesome, apparently because they involve
regulations of commercial speech. 134 This analysis may well provide
an adequate response to the constitutional argument against ex ante
regulation of speech, but as the Supreme Court has recently
recognized, even commercial speech is deemed worthy of special
protection,135 suggesting that one should at the least be quite
concerned as a matter of public policy about authorizing ex ante
regulation of commercial speech-related activity (to say nothing of
non-commercial speech).
Other examples of preferred interests where ex ante regulation
would be troublesome include religious activities (though regulation
of those would raise a host of constitutional issues as well), personal
travel, and certain sexual and reproductive activities protected by the
constitutional "privacy" right. Of course, not surprisingly these
activities (unlike speech) are rarely subject to any ex ante regulation.
A more controversial question is whether ex ante restrictions on
property rights, such as those imposed by building and zoning
permitting schemes, should be deemed to infringe on "preferred
interests."
(6) Clarity of Rules/Benefits of Cooperation

One of the important, practical effects of an ex ante enforcement
scheme is that it requires communication between firms and the
agency prior to regulated activity occurring, and so encourages
information exchange, negotiation, and even cooperation. Thus when
such behavior seems especially valuable, ex ante regulation may be
132. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (Pentagon
Paperscase); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,713-14 (1931).
133. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769-70 (1988);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,449-52 (1938).
134. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49
ARK. L. REv. 687 (1997). The lack of constitutional scrutiny may also be in part because
the regulation is not of the press, unlike many of the prior restraint and licensing schemes
which have been struck down.
135. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501-04 (1996).
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justified. Consider a regulatory regime whose substantive scope and
requirements are not well understood by the public. In such a
situation, preapproval procedures give guidance and certainty to the
regulated public by permitting regulated firms to obtain agency
advice regarding the legality of their conduct before they overstep the
law. However, the advantages of ex ante enforcement in this respect
should not be exaggerated. Many of the benefits to regulated firms
from ex ante regulation, in terms of increased understanding and
certainty regarding the state of the law and enforcement policy, can
be obtained from voluntary preapproval regimes (such as the SEC's
no-action letter procedures) just as effectively as from mandatory
preclearance but without the coercive aspects of ex ante regulation.
Furthermore, the implications of legal clarity, or lack of clarity, are
not entirely straightforward. One might argue, for example, that clear
rules actually support the creation of ex ante enforcement power
because clarity tends to leave less scope for agency interpretation or
avoidance of judicial review and so limits the danger of agency abuse
of discretion, 136 while unclear rules give greater scope to agency
overreaching and so increase the threat of abuse.
The crucial consideration, then, in whether to provide for ex
ante enforcement may be the nature of relationships within the
regulated community, more so than the clarity of rules as such. If an
administrative system is characterized by friendly relationships
between the responsible agency and regulated entities, preapproval
authority is less troublesome because the agency and firms are likely
to be able to clarify ambiguities and work out disagreements without
coercion, and without overreaching by the agency through abuse of
its unsupervised authority. On the other hand, where relationships
are adversarial ex ante authority is more troublesome because it has
the effect of stacking the deck heavily in favor of one side, in
contradiction to the usual assumptions of our adversarial system of
justice. Once again, however, the relevance of this consideration
should not be overstated. Ex ante regulation may encourage
cooperation and negotiation, but it is hardly a prerequisite for such
behavior. After all, even most ex post enforcement actions are settled
through negotiation, many before any charges have even been filed
by the agency. Furthermore, even when relationships between firms
and the agency are not cooperative, for the reasons noted above ex
ante regulation may be justified if regulatory violations by firms are
particularly frequent and willful.
136. One example of a permitting system where clear rules seem to limit the potential
for abuse seems to be the Clean Water Act's regulation, enforced by the EPA, of all point
sources of effluent discharges. See Clean Water Act, §§ 304(b), 306, 33 U.S.C. §§1314(b),
1316 (1994).

July 1999]

MODES OF REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

(7) Information Costs: Lack of a Record

One serious disadvantage of ex ante enforcement is that because
it requires agencies to make enforcement decisions before the
regulated activity has occurred, it necessitates decisions with a
limited, sometimes inadequate record. Ex ante enforcement schemes
typically operate by having firms, prior to engaging in regulated
activity, file an application with the responsible agency seeking
permission to proceed. The agency then makes its decision based on
the firm's description of its planned conduct, combined with the
agency's estimation of the impact or nature of the planned activity.
This inquiry is by its nature guesswork, often with very limited data,
and is sometimes simply impossible to conduct with any accuracy.
Estimating the anticompetitive impact of a proposed merger, for
example, is often such a complex undertaking that any ex ante
analysis is likely to be very speculative. 137 A partial solution to this
conundrum is to require full and thorough disclosure by firms of their
planned activity as part of their permit application, with strong
Such disclosure
penalties for intentional nondisclosure.
requirements, however, are difficult to enforce since the agency may
never know what it does not know, and even if effective they do not
eliminate the inherent difficulty of guessing the impact of conduct
before it occurs, as ex ante enforcement often requires agencies to do.
Furthermore, firms do not always know the precise contours of their
future conduct in advance. The problem is thus to some extent an
insurmountable one.
What all of this suggests is that ex ante enforcement may be
inadvisable in contexts where a complete record may be especially
helpful (or necessary) in identifying violations or determining their
nature and severity. This is likely to be true when the regulation
being enforced defines violations in terms of the impact of regulated
activity (for example, the ban on anticompetitive mergers), or where
the regulated activity does not tend to be planned in detail at
inception. Under these circumstances, waiting to see what happens,
i.e., relying on ex post enforcement, may be the least costly and errorprone alternative.
(8) Volume of Regulated Activity
A final important consideration in choosing a mode of
administrative enforcement is the simple volume of regulated activity,
137. Regarding the information costs of ex ante regulation in slightly different contexts,
see STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANAL-YSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 281-82 (1987); Richard
A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 960
(1997); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for
Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation,107 YALE LJ. 1163, 1266-71 (1998).
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and concomitantly, the volume of agency decisions which would be
necessary under an ex ante enforcement regime. In particular, when
the volume of activity is high, use of ex ante enforcement becomes
quite problematic for two reasons. The first problem is simply one of
administrative costs. Ex ante regulation by its nature imposes
substantial administrative costs since it requires the creation of a
decision-making apparatus (i.e., a bureaucracy) to regularly pass on
applications for agency approval, and also imposes large social costs
on regulated firms which must prepare and submit applications.
When the volume of activity and occasions for agency review are
limited, however, these costs are likely to be reasonably low, and may
well be made up for in saved investigatory costs. When the volume of
activity is high, however, administrative costs mount rapidly, to the
point where they may overwhelm any social benefits from the
regulatory scheme itself. This problem is exacerbated if the regulated
activity is not only frequent, but also tends to vary greatly from
incident to incident, since this requires increased agency resources to
evaluate each individual application. Ultimately, the whole endeavor
may well become not worth the cost-though given the selfperpetuating power of bureaucracy, that is of course no guarantee
that the system will be dismantled. When volume of activity is high,
therefore, authorizing ex ante enforcement is a perilous path on which
to embark. Ex post enforcement, on the other hand, might be
effectively employed to deter violations even in high-volume contexts
through the imposition of stiff penalties, unless the incidence
or
138
willfulness of violations is especially high (see factor 1, above).
Beyond the imposition of high administrative costs, high volume
of activity also tends to aggravate the other problems associated with
ex ante enforcement because it tends to create further barriers to
effective supervision of agency personnel. A high volume of activity
means that individual agency personnel will be evaluating large
numbers of applications, probably fairly quickly and informally.
Martin Shapiro designates such procedures as "high volume, lowlevel" decisions. 139 The pyramidal structure of an agency means that
review of such decisions by agency higher-ups is likely to be quite
limited. Lack of supervision, however, inevitably grants line
personnel a great deal of unfettered discretion, and therefore creates
the potential for arbitrariness or "rogue lawmaking" described
138. If an industry is characterized by both a high volume of activity (factor 8) and a
high incidence of violations (factor 1), there seems no simple solution to the problem of
effective enforcement. In that hopefully rare situation, a more basic reassessment of the
regulatory regime seems called for.
139. Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion" The Next Stage, 92 YALE W. 1487,
1501-02 (1983).
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previously. As such, a high volume of activity provides quite a
compelling argument against ex ante enforcement.
The above discussion identifies a number of different factors
which policymakers should bear in mind in deciding how to design (or
reformulate) an enforcement regime for a particular administrative
scheme. Obviously, not all factors will be present or determinable in
any particular case, and the different factors that are ascertainable are
likely to tug in different directions. The above discussion therefore
does not provide a blueprint for decision, it merely provides a
framework within which policy judgments can be made. However,
the framework can be of great value in guiding analysis, and can be
especially valuable in certain situations where a number of factors
push heavily in one direction, and no strong countervailing arguments
exist. In the next section, I will apply this framework to specific
regulatory regimes in an attempt to generate some useful insights and
identify needed reforms.
II. Evaluations and Conclusions
In the modern administrative state, ex ante enforcement in the
form of prereview, permitting requirements, licensure, and the like
are quite widespread, and can be found in a variety of substantive
areas. Nonetheless, it is a fair statement that ex post enforcement in
the form of agency-initiated investigations and prosecutions, perhaps
supplemented by regular inspections or burden-shifting rules, remains
the norm. Ex post enforcement comports better with the common
law tradition, as well as with traditional American notions of due
process and the proper role of the state. The question one might ask,
then, is why in particular instances we have chosen to depart from
that model and move towards an ex ante enforcement regime instead.
The answers turn out to be complex and varied. In some instances,
such as the FDA's preapproval powers, legislators seem to have been
driven by a desire to prevent the irreparable injury that would be
caused by the sale of dangerous food additives or drugs. 14 In other
situations, such as HSR premerger review, the driving force seems to
have been a desire to alleviate the remedial difficulties agencies faced
in ex post prosecutions.' 4' In yet other cases, such as BATF's
preclearance of alcohol labels or the SEC's prereview of securities
prospectuses, 142 the answer is simply unclear. Whatever the original
140. See supra Part II.D.
141. See id.
142. Given the historical context, the primary motivation behind the Securities Act of
1933 seems to have been to restore investor confidence in securities markets through a
system of predisclosure and agency oversight, rather than any specific enforcement
objectives or concerns. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 169-85
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reasons, the analysis set forth above provides a framework within
which a reassessment might be made of the wisdom of these schemes.
Many of the current ex ante enforcement regimes turn out to be quite
defensible under my analysis, though perhaps needing some
improvements to address the concerns raised in this paper; but with
respect to some regulatory regimes the analysis suggests that
Congress should seriously consider eliminating the agencies' ex ante
authority, and revert instead to a more traditional prosecutorial
model.
A. Hart-Scott-Rodino
The twentieth anniversary of the passage of HSR has produced a
flood of commentary over the past few years assessing the merits of
the legislation. 43 Some commentators strongly support HSR and its
consequences, 144 others attack it,145 while a few fall in the middle,
proposing reform but not elimination of merger prereview. 146 HSR is
unquestionably a hard case, given the powerful (and vociferously
presented) arguments for and against its procedures. My analysis, not
surprisingly, confirms that the social value of merger preclearance is
open to debate. Ultimately, however, I fall within the third camp,
advocating retention of the HSR procedures, but with some
important reforms.
The arguments in favor of premerger review are fairly clear.
Anticompetitive mergers are difficult to detect, even long after they
have been consummated, and even if detected agencies face
enormously expensive litigation in trying to challenge them.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, even if an ex post
challenge is successfully brought, agencies then face huge remedial
difficulties in trying to "undo" the merger and restore the competitive
status quo prior to the merger; and during the time period when
litigation is occurring, or a remedy is being implemented, the public at
large can suffer serious financial injury from supra-competitive prices.
(1984). If so, the justification for continued retention of the preclearance requirement,
over 70 years after the Great Crash of 1929, is somewhat unclear, especially in light of the
great changes in financial conditions and the operation of financial markets in the
intervening period.
143. See, e.g., Kolasky & Lowe, supra note 78, at 889 (1997); William Blumenthal,
Symposium: Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger Enforcement, Introductory Note,
65 ANrTRUST L.J. 813 (1997); Baer, supra note 59, at 849-52 (1997); Sims & Herman,
supra note 59, at 881-83 (1997); Malcolm R. Pfunder, Some Reflections on, and Modest
Proposals for Reform of, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification Program, 65
ANTRUST

L.J. 905,907-08 (1997).

144. See Baer, supranote 59.

145. See Sims and Herman, supra note 59.
146. See Pfunder, supra note 143; Kolasky & Lowe, supra note 78.
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In addition, the antitrust law of mergers is notoriously vague and
unclear so that premerger review probably provides a valuable
avenue for merging firms to gain information regarding the relevant
agencies' legal views, and in most instances to fix the merger ahead of
time through negotiation to avoid any looming legal problems.
Indeed, the negotiation and "Fix it First" policies adopted by the
agencies towards mergers highlight the prevalence and value of
negotiation in this area. Finally, the nature of the regulated activitycorporate mergers-is in no way a "preferred" or protected activity,
suggesting that some additional regulatory burden should be
tolerable. Thus, among the factors set forth above, factors 2, 3, 5, 6,
and to some extent factor 1 (only to some extent though, as we shall
see) support retention of the HSR ex ante enforcement scheme.
If that were the end of the analysis, reaching a conclusion would
be easy-retain HSR. Unfortunately, it is not; there are also
substantial arguments that HSR is socially costly. Most notably, the
volume of regulated activity, meaning the number of mergers subject
to HSR, is very large and, due to the interaction between inflation
and the statutory jurisdictional limits, has expanded dramatically over
the years from 861 in 1979 to 3,087 in 1996.147 This expansion has
imposed enormous administrative costs on the agencies, and sharply
restricted their ability to perform their other duties. 148 Furthermore,
the incidence of violations is relatively low--only five percent of
reported transactions result in any further agency investigation
(through a "Second Request"), 149 and of course not all of those result
in any agency action beyond investigation. All of this means a lot of
resources spent on prereview, a very large percentage of which is
essentially wasted. Moreover, the social costs of HSR review are also
substantial, both because filing itself is expensive and because in the
context of corporate mergers delay is extremely expensive, indeed
often fatal. That delay is costly also raises the danger of arbitrary
agency behavior. Agency lawmaking is widely noted to be a
particular problem in the merger area.150 Finally, the complexity of
the competitive analysis of mergers means that merger prereview
inevitably forces agencies to make difficult judgments based on
inadequate records-though this factor is admittedly of limited
persuasive force because the facts necessary to properly analyze a
merger are difficult to determine even after a merger has occurred.
In sum, factors 1, 4, 8, and to some extent 7 push against retention of
HSR prereview.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Kolasky & Lowe, supra note 78 at 891 n.5.
See idL at 891 n.6; Sims & Herman, supra note 59 at 890.
See Pfunder, supra note 143 at 912.
See supra Part II.C.
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Ultimately the arguments for retention of HSR seem to be
compelling, especially because the underlying activity, corporate
mergers, is not so inherently valuable that administrative burdens, or
even overenforcement by agencies, raise great social concerns, and
because pre-HSR experience suggests that the barriers to effective ex
post enforcement in this area are often insurmountable. Some
reforms, however, are indicated. Most notably, the volume of
transactions subject to HSR review should be reduced in order to
cure the "high volume, low level" problem-probably by raising the
jurisdictional limits of transactions subject to HSR to reflect inflation
and the rise in financial asset prices since 1976, and then indexing the
limits to ongoing inflation. In addition, the agencies' ability to impose
delay on mergers through onerous interim procedures such as
"Second Request" discovery should be curbed, perhaps by granting
firms the ability to challenge such requests on an expedited basis, or
more radically, by requiring the agency to go to court if it wishes to
obtain further discovery.' 5 ' Finally, in combination with reform of the
discovery procedures, the existing time limits for agency action under
HSR should be enforced strictly to insure as far as possible that the
costs of delay are mitigated. Assuming these steps are taken, the
HSR premerger review procedures will remain a valuable and
important part of the FTC and Antitrust Division's enforcement
arsenal, and well worth retaining.
B. FDA Preapproval

The primary justification for the requirements of FDA ex ante
preapproval of food additives and drugs is unquestionably remedial,
and in particular to prevent, as far as possible, the irreparable injuries
that would be caused by the public sale of dangerous food or drug
products. That overwhelming concern, combined with the fact that
the regulated activity does not seem to implicate any "preferred
interests," has led to a longstanding acceptance of the FDA's
preapproval regime, albeit with some controversy due to the delays
imposed by the regime on the release of new drugs. 52 Interestingly,

however, the other factors laid out above almost all seem to argue
against the FDA's authority, to a greater or lesser degree. The
volume of regulated activities is very large, and the likelihood and
151. The latter solution creates the danger that firms will intentionally submit
incomplete or deceptive HSR filings, knowing that the agency will be deterred from
seeking further information. A possible solution to this problem would be to authorize
stiff, prompt penalties for obviously inadequate filings.
152. See Noah, supra note 51, at 880-81 (noting complaints raised about FDA-imposed
delays in release of AIDS treatment drugs, and the expedited approval procedures
established by the agency in response).
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willfulness of violations is small-after all, few companies would
choose to intentionally release dangerous products, given the massive
tort liability they would eventually face for such conduct (not to
mention any moral qualms the firms may also have). Furthermore,
detection of dangerous products is not particularly difficult once a
dangerous product has been sold (presumably people would fall ill),
153
and once identified a recall would effectively prevent future harm.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the costs of delay in this
context are huge, particularly with respect to drugs, both to the firms

who must forego profits and watch patents expire, and to society
which must do without potentially valuable medical treatments while
154
awaiting FDA review (as the AIDS controversy has demonstrated).

How to balance these opposing considerations is ultimately a
policy judgment that in a democracy only the elected representatives
of the people can make. Congress's decision to retain the FDA's ex
ante powers thus must be taken as a judgment that the human safety
concerns addressed by the FDA preapproval regime outweigh all of

the other factors cutting against ex ante authority. Nonetheless, some
suggestions for revisions to the current system do emerge.

Most

importantly, all feasible steps should be taken to limit delay in the
FDA's review procedures-a suggestion which is surely not radical or
new. 155 In addition, the FDA should be encouraged, or in the event
of agency obduracy required by Congress, to publish clear statements

of its legal interpretations and enforcement policies, both in order to
reduce public uncertainty, and more importantly, in order to provide
a check against the kind of "private lawmaking" and
overenforcement that ex ante enforcement authority facilitates. The

FDA has in fact been notoriously resistant to such steps, 15 6 suggesting
153. Admittedly, firms may choose to release ineffective drugs sometimes and detection
of such drugs would be far more difficult than detection of dangerous drugs. However,
ineffective drugs do not pose the same danger of irreparable injury as dangerous drugs.
Nonetheless, concern about ineffective drugs (and possible, unwarranted reliance on them
by patients) provides another argument in favor of FDA preapproval authority.
154. Factors 6 and 7, clarity of rules and the need for a complete record, seem neither
here nor there with respect to FDA preapproval. The current FDA standards regarding
food and drug safety are indeed somewhat unclear, but that may be as much a product of
as a reason for preapproval authority. And while a record of usage may be helpful to the
agency, the other crucial information needed to make safety judgments-primarily clinical
trials-may be easier to obtain before rather than after sale, because of the difficulty of
obtaining control groups once a medication is available.
155. The details of how such reform would be implemented are, however, controversial,
and fortunately well beyond the scope of this article. The difficult judgment, of course, is
how far to trade off reduced delay against increased risk to human health.
156. See generally Lars Noah, The FDA's New Policy on Guidelines:Having Your Cake
and Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. RFV. 113 (1997) (regarding FDA's arguments against
being bound by its own rules); Richard M. Thomas, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Agency
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the need for legislative prodding. This step alone might do a great
deal to limit the worst consequences of ex ante enforcement, while

retaining the important benefits.
In addition to preapproval of food additives and prescription
drugs, under 1990 legislation the FDA also has preapproval power

over all health claims made on food labeling. 5 7 Here, the arguments

for retention of ex ante enforcement powers are far weaker than with
potentially dangerous food and drug products. The strongest
argument for retaining ex ante authority is probably the difficulty of
detecting false health claims, since though such claims are by
definition made to the public, the accuracy of such claims is not
facially obvious, and is very expensive and time-consuming to

determine through investigation. In addition, it may be, as some
commentators claim, that the incidence of violations is likely to be
high in this area absent preclearance. 158 But the arguments against
preclearance authority seem more powerful. The harms caused by
false health claims which initially escape detection because of the lack
of preapproval seem trivial-a little more junk food inadvertently
consumed by the American public will hardly threaten the Republic,
and the danger of over-reliance on "health foods" by the seriously ill

seems a little far-fetched. The volume of regulated activity is
potentially huge. Finally, and most critically, the regulated activity
here is speech, a quintessential preferred interest. In light of these
powerful considerations, the arguments for preapproval seem weak
indeed, suggesting that Congress should seriously consider amending

the 1990 Nutrition Labeling Act to limit the FDA to ex post
enforcement powers only.159

Self-Regulation, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 153 (1992) (giving an example of when the FDA

avoided issuing self-binding enforcement guidelines).
157. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(i), (q), & (r)
(1994); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Elisabeth A. Sachs, Health Claims in the Marketplace: The Future of the
FDA and the FTC's Regulatory Split, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 263,268 (1993).

159. Many of the same arguments made here would also seem to apply to the FDA's
preapproval of prescription drug labeling, suggesting the need to reconsider that power as
well. The issues surrounding labeling are more complex, however, because of the
difficulty of disentangling approval of the drug itself from approval of the drug's uses
which labeling promotes (as well as because of the statutory exemption from FDA
jurisdiction for the practice of medicine), and because the potential costs imposed on
society by mislabeled drugs are probably much higher than those imposed by mislabeled
foods. See generally James M. Beck and Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and
Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71

(1998); cf. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998)
(striking down on First Amendment grounds limitations imposed by FDA on drug
manufacturers' provision of information regarding off-label uses of drugs).
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C. BATF Preapproval of Alcohol Labels
Most of the arguments set forth in the previous paragraph

regarding FDA preapproval of food health claims would also seem to
argue against retention of BATF's preapproval authority over alcohol
labeling. 16 The injury caused to a consumer in purchasing a few
items of mislabeled alcohol seem trivial. In practice, such mislabeling
is likely to consist of incorrect or difficult-to-decipher health
warnings, or inaccurate or deceptive descriptions of the precise
content of the beverage. 161 Alcohol warnings, however, are after all

ubiquitous, so that one indecipherable label will not have a
perceptible impact on consumer knowledge; and while misdescribing

the content of a beverage does cause real, financial injury, it is hardly
the sort of serious, irremediable injury associated with adulterated

foods or dangerous drugs.

Furthermore, as with all labeling

violations, detection does not seem very difficult. The volume of
regulated activity is also enormous, 162 and as discussed previously 63
the costs of delay to alcohol producers whose labels have been
disapproved are very high. Furthermore, the BATF is not well

known for its cooperative relationships with regulated firms or the
general public,164 suggesting that preapproval powers create a serious
potential for abuse in this context, perhaps more serious than with the
FDA. Finally, as with food labeling the crucial consideration here is
probably that the regulated activity is speech, albeit generally (though
not always165 ) commercial speech, so that prior restraints and
unfettered regulatory discretion raise particularly serious concerns. It
is possible to identify some arguments in favor of preclearance for
alcohol labeling, most notably that the incidence and willfulness of
160. For a description of the BATF's authority in this regard, see supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
161. Gross misrepresentations of contents seems very unlikely, since it is hardly in a
manufacturer's interest to trick a consumer who is trying to buy vodka into buying gin.
Instead, inaccuracies are more likely to involve subtle gradations such as the exact
appellation of a particular wine, or whether a wine which is only 55% cabernet sauvignon
may be described on the label as a cabernet.
162. See Fiscal Year 1999 Treasury-Postal Appropriations: Before the Subcomm. on
Treasury, Gen. Gov't, and Civil Serv. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,105th Cong.
(1998) (statement of John W. Magaw, Director, BATF, that BATF has over 1.5 million
approved labels on file).; Consultant,supra note 5 (BATF reviews approximately 60,000
labels per year).
163. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
164. See ConsultantRenews Attack on BA TF Label Approval Delays, FOOD LABELING
NEWS, Vol. 4, No. 4 (October 26,1995).
165. For an example of noncommercial speech appearing on alcohol labels, consider
the current controversy over the wine and industry's efforts to place accurate information
about the health effects of wine on wine bottles. See Gerald D. Boyd, New Wine Label
Causes Uproar,S. F. CHRON., March 17,1999, at Food Section 6 (March 17,1999).
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violations here might well be significant, making effective ex post
enforcement difficult and expensive;166 but they seem to pale in
comparison to the arguments against ex ante authority.
As with the FDA's preclearance of health claims therefore, there
is a strong argument that Congress should repeal the BATF's
preclearance authority over alcohol labeling, and replace it with an ex
post enforcement regime. 167 If the agency contends that a pure ex
post enforcement system would place too great an investigatory
burden on it, Congress might consider combining prosecutorial
authority with imposing a simple predisclosure filing obligation on
firms. Such a predisclosure requirement would mandate that firms
file with the agency, on or before the date of the first sale, all new
labels for products the firm intends to sell to the public, but would
deny the agency any power to block sales unless the agency goes to
court and obtains an injunction, after proving a statutory violation.
Such a scheme would appear to address all of the agency's legitimate
concerns, while curbing its ability to engage in arbitrary behavior.
D. SEC Preapproval of Prospectuses

The Securities Act of 1933168 requires that any documents to be
distributed in connection with the issuance and sale of new securities
must be submitted for preclearance to the SEC, and the sale may not
proceed unless and until the documents are approved by the
Commission's staff.169 The primary justification for this rule would
appear to be the prevention of consumer fraud, which was believed to
be one of the causes of the financial instability associated with the

Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. Like FDA regulation of
166. The lack of clarity regarding labeling requirements might also seem to support
preclearance, but this is a weak argument. As noted previously, tobacco products are
subject to similar labeling requirements as alcohol, but with ex post enforcement only, and
regulators have had little difficulty in devising clear standards. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
1333(b) (1994) (setting out detailed requirements for location and appearance of tobacco
warning labels).
167. These same factors also provide a powerful argument against the BATF's resent
proposed regulations which would permit the agency to unilaterally revoke an already
approved label if the agency determined that the regulated firm was attempting to market
its product to miners. See William S. Morrow, Jr., Pouring Old Wine Into New Labels, 24
Administrative and Regulatory Law News 1, 3 (Summer 1999). Such authority would
provide the agency with enormous coercive power over what is after all a speech-related
activity, and also exposes the agency's own understanding of the enormous power inherent
in its preapproval power over labels.
168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c); BLUMENTHAL, supra note 53, at 189-94. The actual SEC
preclearance system for prospectuses is a bit more complicated than the text implies, and
is described in more detail supra note 23 and accompanying text; but as noted there, in
practice the system appears to operate as a true preclearance scheme.
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health claims and BATF regulation of alcohol labeling, this rule
constitutes ex ante regulation of speech, and therefore would seem to
be at least suspect as a matter of public policy. The arguments for
and against ex ante authority in this context are more complex,
however, because of the distinct concerns raised by securities fraud.
Unlike labeling violations, securities fraud is not always easy to detect
(indeed, it is the source of large amounts of expensive litigation), and
the costs imposed by undetected securities fraud are far more serious
than mislabeling, since such fraud imposes injury not only on
defrauded purchasers, but also on the public at large because of the
resulting loss of confidence in financial markets. Individual victims,
of course, can be compensated through financial reparations
(assuming the violator can be located and is solvent), but the social
harm of such violations is difficult to remedy through any ex post
enforcement. The rules regarding what does, and does not, constitute
securities fraud are also necessarily quite vague, so that preclearance
provides an attractive avenue for firms to obtain legal advice from the
agency. Finally, the SEC is an agency which appears to enjoy the
respect of, and quite friendly relationships with the industry it
regulates, which substantially mitigates the fear of arbitrariness and
overreaching. All of these arguments suggest that the SEC's
preapproval authority is distinguishable from the FDA's and the
BATF's, and should be retained.
On the other hand, it should be noted that some factors argue
powerfully against ex ante SEC authority. Most importantly, the costs
of delay in the securities industry are of course extremely high,
suggesting that the preapproval regime currently in place is
expensive, and potentially subject to abuse (though the apparently
friendly relationships between the agency and industry alleviate this
concern somewhat). In addition, one might question whether the
information needed to properly judge the accuracy of a sales
document is really available to the agency before the sale has
occurred, as required by a preclearance system, since the most
controversial statements are likely to be those regarding estimates of
future performance. 170 Finally, the high volume of regulated activity
also cuts against preapproval, both because of high administrative
costs and because high volume inevitably undermines the quality and
Balancing these competing
consistency of decision-making.
legislative task, which
is
once
again
a
quintessentially
considerations
of
prereview. Barring
resolved
in
favor
at least in 1933 Congress
constitutional concerns, 71 that judgment must be respected, though it
170. The apparent effect of this uncertainty has been to seriously limit the substantive
content of securities sales documents-a result which is surely not socially beneficial.
171. Compare Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK.
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is probably time for Congress to at least reconsider and perhaps
(though not necessarily) reverse the judgment it made in 1933 in light
of changed circumstances, including notably the enormously greater
public confidence in financial markets, as well as the explosion in
private securities litigation which deters violations by issuers.
E.

Environmental Permits (Clean Water Act)

Two other ex ante enforcement systems that were briefly touched
upon in this article were the Army Corps of Engineers' preclearance
requirement for placing dredged materials into wetlands, and the
Environmental Protection Agency's effluent discharge permitting
system for point sources under the Clean Water Act. 72 The use of
preclearance or permitting systems in the environmental context
appears to be premised on two primary factors: the difficulty of
detecting pollution and, even more so, identifying polluters under an
ex post enforcement regime; and the irreversible harm done to the
environment by pollution, which can be better prevented through ex
ante than through ex post enforcement. In addition, the activities that
are regulated-generally the operation of industrial facilities, or land
development-are not generally considered to implicate any specially
favored interests, though that consensus may be changing; 173 and

policymakers appear to treat the burden of ex ante enforcement as an
acceptable price to pay for a clean environment.
In the case of the Clean Water Act, the congressional judgment
to authorize ex ante enforcement seems a defensible one. The EPA's
permitting system has proved to be workable, in part because of the
relatively low volume of activity and in part because the relatively
clear rules governing effluent discharges' 74 permit the EPA and
regulated firms to negotiate without great danger of agency
overreaching. The wetlands regulations, however, are more open to
criticism. First of all, the difficulty of detection is less obvious in the
case of filled wetlands, since the responsible party is almost always
the landowner involved. If the concern were the agency's inability to
detect violations in the first place, given the vast geographic
jurisdiction of wetlands regulation, a disclosure requirement would
L. REv. 687, 691-92 (1997) (no constitutional concerns) with Aleta G. Estreicher,
Securities Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223 (1990) (constitutional

concerns).
172. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
173. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (striking down land use
regulations pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825,831 (1987).
174. See Clean Water Act, §§ 304(b), 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b), 1316 (1994); supra Part
II.E.6.
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seem an adequate solution. Concomitantly, the vast jurisdiction of
wetlands regulation implies a very high volume of regulated activity,
raising a classic "high volume, low-level" problem in supervising
individual permitting decisions. Furthermore, filled wetlands are
often (though admittedly not always) more easily remediable than
polluted bodies of water, also reducing the barriers to ex
post enforcement. There are also arguably preferred interests at
stake here, in the form of property rights. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the agency in question, the Army Corps of Engineers,
has a reputation for actively, and arguably illegitimately, expanding
its jurisdiction and powers by relying on the lack of clarity in
governing rules. 175 All of this suggests an agency which is willing to
wield its enforcement powers aggressively, in a context where
agency/regulated relationships are likely to be contentious. In other
words, this is precisely the sort of context where ex ante authority
should be of greatest concern. It may be that Congress has judged
that the high social costs of environmental harm outweigh all of these
considerations, and that the loss of enforcement efficiency entailed by
a move to ex post enforcement is therefore unacceptable; but unless
such a judgment has explicitly been made, it may be time for
Congress to reconsider whether the current balance is really a wise
one.
The preceding discussion has provided a mere survey of some
major ex ante enforcement schemes, as viewed through the lens of this
paper's analytic framework. The same sort of analysis might be
usefully applied to any number of other such regimes, as well as to
administrative systems which are currently enforced through ex post
prosecution, but might be more effective if converted to ex
ante enforcement. Finally, it must be acknowledged that the analysis
set forth here cannot alone be expected to generate legislative
action-in the real world regulatory reform is a complex, political
game, where no one argument can drive legislation or results.
Nonetheless, it is to be hoped that the perspective, the view of the
cathedral, 176 set forth here will yield some valuable prescriptions for
change.
Conclusion
In the study of the regulatory state, there exists a great divide
175. See Robert A. Anthony, "Well, You Want the Permit,Don't You?": Agency Efforts
to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 31, 39 (1992)
(describing Army Corps' expansion of its jurisdiction through an extremely broad
interpretation of the term "waters of the United States").
176. Cf.Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1128 (1972).
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between examinations of the procedures followed by regulatory
agencies in formulating, enforcing, and defending the policies which
they are authorized to implement, which generally fall within the
rubric of administrative law; and examinations of the substance of the
policies and rules implemented by agencies, which fall within the
rubric of a myriad of specialized subjects such as antitrust law,
environmental law, food and drug law, or regulated industries. There
is of course some overlap among the scholars who specialize in these
fields, but generally the subjects are taught and written about as
distinct areas of the law. Within that framework, this was a paper
about procedure, about administrative law. I have sought to identify
and analyze the different ways or modes through which
administrative agencies enforce the substantive rules and policies
over which they have been given authority by the legislature. Far too
little attention, either legislative or academic, has been given to this
question of enforcement methodologies, which after all represent the
operative mechanisms through which agencies are permitted to act
against and coerce private citizens. This is unfortunate because, as I
have demonstrated, the procedures through which an agency is
authorized to implement regulation can have a profound and
sometimes unforeseen impact on the power and discretion available
to the agency, as well as on the nature of relationships between
agencies and the subjects of regulation.
Beyond this fairly traditional administrative law analysis,
however, I want to suggest a more basic issue which has emerged
from my paper: the artificiality and danger of the traditional
dichotomy in regulatory studies between procedure and substance. In
fact, my analysis suggests that there is a deep relationship between
the procedures through which agencies are permitted to enforce their
rules and policies, and the power agencies possess to shape the
substance of those rules and policies. As such, ultimately changes in
procedure can result in regulated entities being subject in practice to
profoundly different substantive rules and constraints. In closing I
suggest that this close relationship between procedure and substance
provides yet another reason why administrative procedure matters a
great deal, and needs to be studied in detail; but also why such
procedural analysis cannot be conducted in isolation from an
awareness of the substantive rules which administrative procedures
implement.

